

a *Regerings-reglement*—i.e. constitutional regulation—modelled on the charter of 1803 and based on the principle of freedom of cultivation and trade. A month later he issued a decree throwing open the trade of the Netherlands Indies.

Napoleon's return from Elba and the Waterloo campaign delayed the departure of the commissioners, and when they arrived in Java, in April 1816, John Fendall, Raffles's successor, had received no instructions to hand over. Not until 19 August did the official ceremony of rendition take place. There were further difficulties and delays in the case of the other possessions, especially those in or about Sumatra, for in March 1818 Raffles returned to the scene as Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen and began to work with might and main against the restoration of Dutch power there. Calcutta, however, supported the Dutch against him, and after the surrender of Malacca in September 1818 all their old stations were handed over speedily except Padang, which Raffles managed to retain until May 1819.

The new government found its task a heavy one. The Dutch had lost much of their old prestige. The home country was too poor to give adequate financial support, and the commissioners had no fleet at their disposal and only a very small army. Overseas trade was mainly in British and American hands. Moreover, under the liberal system introduced by Raffles the cultivation of export crops, which had been the chief aim of the old Dutch administration, had fallen into decay.

The financial question was perhaps the most pressing one. Under both Daendels and Raffles the colony had failed to pay its way. Elout found that the British 'taxation system', as opposed to the Dutch 'trade system', was much more profitable for the individual than for the state. As a liberal he was predisposed to favour free peasant cultivation. So, he found, was Muntinghe, when the question was referred to the Council of the Indies. Hence, after a prolonged tour of inspection, the decision was taken to retain Raffles's land-rent system, using the *desa* method of assessment. The system was to be gradually improved by measuring up and valuing the land, and in order to help the taxpayer to keep out of the hands of the moneylender he was to be free to pay his tax in either money or kind.

These principles were embodied in Land-rent Ordinances published in 1818 and 1819. They determined the framework of the system of territorial administration which was laid down by the commissioners-general in a *Regerings-reglement* issued in December

#### CHAPTER 32

### THE RESTORED DUTCH RÉGIME IN INDONESIA AND THE CULTURE SYSTEM, 1816-48

AFTER Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig in 1813 the Dutch had joined in the general revolt against him. Van Hogendorp's younger brother organized a provisional government and recalled William VI of Orange, the son of the old Stadhouder, from England. As sovereign prince under the new Fundamental Law adopted in 1814, he was given extensive powers, which included not only the management of the state's finances but also 'exclusive control' over the colonies. In the following year, when by the union of Belgium and Holland the kingdom of the United Netherlands was formed under the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, William's rank was raised to that of king.

By the Convention of London, accepted by both sides on 13 August 1814, provision was made for the restitution by Britain of all the former colonies of the Dutch East India Company 'conquered from Holland since 1803', save the Cape Colony. Ceylon was excluded from this agreement, since it had already been ceded to Britain in 1802 by the Peace of Amiens. The tin-bearing island of Banka off the east coast of Sumatra, which had been conquered in 1812, was exchanged for Cochin on the Malabar Coast of India. The remark was once made that Britain acquired her empire in the nineteenth century in a fit of absentmindedness. In much the same vein is Stapel's suggestion that the reason why there was no opposition in Britain to the restitution of Java was because the British had no idea of its value and beauty.<sup>1</sup>

To take over the government of the Dutch islands the king appointed three commissioners-general: Cornelis Theodorus Elout, Baron van der Capellen, a statesman of high reputation, and A. A. Buyskes, previously lieutenant governor-general under Daendels. Elout, the chairman, was a liberal of the orthodox school of the day—i.e. a humanitarian and a follower of Adam Smith. When the others returned home van der Capellen was to remain behind as governor-general. In January 1815 the king furnished the commissioners with

<sup>1</sup> Gijssbert Karel. The colonial reformer was Dirk.

<sup>2</sup> In his single-volume *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indië*, 1943 edition, p. 225.

1818. This retained Raffles's framework of Residencies, Districts, Divisions and Villages, with the District renamed 'Regency' and the Division 'District'. But whereas Raffles's system had tended towards direct rule, with the Regent and his native staff subordinate to the Resident, the new arrangements reverted to the method of 'super-vision', the old dual system, whereby the Regent, though shorn of many of his attributes as a hereditary noble, was in charge of a separate branch of the administration.<sup>1</sup> And his subordination to the Resident tended once again to become feudal rather than administrative. He was to be treated as a 'younger brother'—i.e. a vassal ruler in the accepted meaning of a term that was current throughout South-East Asia. These arrangements applied only to Java. Elsewhere, in what the Dutch called the 'Outer Provinces', the native peoples remained under the rule of their own chieftains, who themselves were under the supervision of the Dutch provincial governors.

The system of justice underwent a more thoroughgoing revision, though here again much of Raffles's system was retained. The old dual system of different law and separate courts for Europeans and natives was revived and strengthened, and where Raffles had appointed a single judge or magistrate, sitting alone with either a jury or assessors, the old method of a bench of judges, each with a vote, was restored. For natives the Residency Courts and Circuit Courts of the Raffles régime were retained. The former was renamed *Landraad* and consisted of a bench of native judges under the presidency of a Dutch official. For Europeans the Courts of Justice established by Raffles at the ports of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya were retained, while others were set up at Amboina, Macassar, Malacca and, in 1825, Padang. That of Batavia became a High Court with general appellate jurisdiction for the whole of the Netherlands Indies.

The commissioners-general made all manner of regulations for the protection of the native. Native officials were to be remunerated by the method of fixed salaries instead of by assignments of land worked for them by serf labour. They might not engage in trade or industry, nor might *desa* headmen hire out the labour of their villages under any pretext whatever. The slave-trade was forbidden, and Raffles's regulations regarding slavery were confirmed. Unfortunately, however, the safeguards were more honoured in precept than in practice. And, like Raffles, the restored Dutch régime found it necessary to retain the forced coffee culture in the Preanger, and the *blanding*

<sup>1</sup> See Furnivall's analysis of the principles applied by the *Regerings-reglement* of 1818 in *Netherlands India*, pp. 87-92.

people's serfdom in the teak forests. Worse still, in 1830, with the introduction of the Culture System, the principle of free peasant cultivation was abandoned completely.

By the beginning of 1819 nearly all the Dutch possessions outside Java had been handed over and the work of the commissioners-general was finished. Elout and Buyskes therefore returned home, leaving van der Capellen behind as governor-general. He was the least progressive of the three, and as early as 1820 gave the native chiefs greater powers over their people, in direct contravention of the policy laid down by the *Regerings-reglement*. He disliked the fact that an increasing number of Europeans was taking up planting in Java. He refused to allow them to settle in the Preanger, for fear of their competition with the government's system of coffee culture, which he was extending considerably. And because those who already owned estates there paid higher rates for their Javanese labour than the government, he forced them to sell their coffee to the government at the same price as the Javanese himself.

He was on stronger ground in excluding Europeans and Chinese from all trade in the Preanger. By advancing money to the cultivators they could buy their crops at much lower prices. This practice, besides impoverishing the cultivator, hit the government, for he was unable to pay his taxes in full and tended to sell to private capitalists coffee that was really government property.

In 1822, while on a tour of Java, van der Capellen found that Europeans unable to obtain land from the government could rent it in the native states under agreements known as 'contracts of land-tenancy', which gave the tenant not only the use of the land but also power to exercise the lord's rights over the cultivators attached to it. In the following year he decreed that all such contracts were to become null and void as from 1 January 1824. His action aroused great indignation. Most of the contracts were long-term ones, in respect of which the native chiefs had received large advances, which they would now have to repay. And since they had already spent the money, they could only discharge their debts by further pressing the already depressed cultivator. This bred much discontent and a spirit of resentment against the government, especially in the Jogjakarta area.

To make matters worse, the post-war boom, which had raised the prices of coffee and sugar and brought an increasing number of ships to Javanese ports, gave way to a slump, and hence revenue, which had shown a surplus up to 1822, began to show an annual deficit thereafter. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that land-revenue

continued to increase; it was a fall in revenue from other sources that caused the deficit.

Part of the trouble lay in the fact that the new administration was far more costly than that of Raffles and spent money too freely on roads and other public works. And it so happened that just when a policy of retrenchment was urgently needed van der Capellen had to deal with a number of outbreaks of unrest in the Moluccas, Borneo, Celebes, Palembang and on the west coast of Sumatra, all of which were a drain upon his diminishing financial resources.

From the point of view of most Dutchmen the chief source of grievance was the fact that overseas trade was mainly in foreign hands. Dutch trade was specially favoured by the preferential system of customs duties adopted in 1817; but the superiority of English piece-goods over those produced in the Netherlands enabled British merchants to retain their dominating position. In the hope of dealing a blow at British competition Muntinghe suggested that the Dutch merchants should pool their resources by setting up a big national company with the king at its head. William jumped at the idea, and in 1825 the *Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij* came into existence with a capital initially fixed at 37 million guilders, a guaranteed dividend of 4½ per cent, and the king himself as a principal shareholder. It was a far more ambitious project than Muntinghe had envisaged. In its early years at least it proved just as incapable as the private merchants of combating British competition.

Van der Capellen's efforts to help the native peoples led him to attempt to reduce the evil effects of the spice monopoly upon the Moluccas. He paid the islands a visit in 1824 and announced the abolition of the hated *hongi-tochter*, by means of which the number of spice trees had been kept down to the level required for restricting supply and maintaining prices. He hoped to persuade the home government to abolish the monopoly altogether, but failed to do so.

Van der Capellen also failed to make ends meet. Hence in 1825 it was decided to remove him from office on the score of the inefficiency of his financial administration. King William felt that a special effort was needed to cope with the continued annual deficit, and to this end conferred on his successor, Du Bus de Gisignies, the rank of commissioner-general with special powers to carry through such reforms as he might consider necessary. Van der Capellen should have returned home in 1825, but his departure was delayed by the outbreak of a serious rebellion in central Java.

The Java War of 1825-30 arose from a variety of causes. Discontent had risen to a high pitch in the native states, and particularly in Jogjakarta, where the consequences of van der Capellen's cancellation of contracts for land-lease had hit all classes of people. Another strong grievance was over the tolls levied at the boundaries between native and government territory, and the vexatious exactions of the Chinese to whom they were farmed. The general unrest came to a head under the leadership of a prince of the royal house of Jogjakarta, Diponegoro, who had personal reasons for hating the Dutch. The background of Diponegoro's rebellion is discussed in Chapter 28.

The revolt began when Diponegoro, his co-guardian Mangku Bumi and other discontents 'went to the mountains'. When he suddenly appeared before Jogjakarta with a powerful force the population rose in his support, the Dutch carried away the young sultan, and there was a massacre of Europeans and Chinese toll-farmers. The Dutch were caught on the wrong foot, for a large part of their army was away on an expedition to Palembang and Boni. General de Kock was sent to central Java with so small a force that he could do little to prevent the spread of the conflagration. He did, however, by negotiation persuade the Susuhunan of Surakarta from making common cause with Diponegoro.

There were no pitched battles; Diponegoro and his commanders showed themselves adepts in guerrilla tactics, and even after de Kock was reinforced, continued to maintain the upper hand. In vain did the Dutch restore to the throne Sultan Sepuh, whom Raffles had deposed. He could gain no support and died in 1828.

Gradually, however, de Kock learnt how to deal with the revolt. He began to establish a system of strong-points (*bentengstelel*) in territory recovered from the rebels. These were linked up by good roads on which flying columns operated. Du Bus de Gisignies disliked the high cost of the system, but de Kock was adamant in defending it, and it produced decisive results. In 1828, notwithstanding his assumption of the rank of sultan, Diponegoro was losing ground rapidly, the devastation was appalling, and there were frightful outbreaks of cholera. In 1829 Mangku Bumi and Sentot, Diponegoro's principal lieutenants, finding their position hopeless, deserted to the Dutch. In the next year Diponegoro offered to negotiate. At the conference he refused to give up the title of sultan and protector of Islam in Java, and after much delay de Kock broke the impasse by arresting him. He was banished to Macassar in the north of Celebes, and later removed to Macassar, where he died in 1855.

To prevent a recurrence of trouble the Dutch annexed much territory—Banjumas, Bagelen, Madiun and Kediri—from Jogjakarta and Surakarta. Compensation was paid to both rulers for the loss of territory, but the susuhunan, indignant at the shabby treatment he had received in return for his loyalty, left his kraton and went into retreat. The Dutch, fearful of another outbreak, banished him to Amboina. His successor, Pakuwono VII, without ado signed the treaty offered him by Batavia, and there was no further trouble.

The Java War prevented any real restoration of the financial situation by Du Bus de Gisignies. It had cost 20 million florins and had been financed entirely by loans. He did manage to effect some much-needed reduction in the cost of administration and the number of Residencies; and the establishment of the Java Bank and a new currency was calculated to bring good results in the long run. He also withdrew the prohibition of the land-lease contracts which had caused so much unrest. But at the moment when the financial situation in Java was working up to a crisis Belgium revolted against Holland, and the home government was threatened with bankruptcy.

This final development, however, was unforeseen when King William, aware that some quite new approach must be made to the problem of the Java finances, had appointed Johannes van den Bosch to succeed Du Bus de Gisignies as governor-general and, acting on his advice, had in 1829 issued a *Regerings-reglement* which was to usher in a change of profound importance in economic policy. Van den Bosch was a self-made man who had risen from the ranks of the army in Java, reclaimed a derelict estate near Batavia, quarrelled with Daendels and been deported to Europe in 1810, spent two years as a prisoner-of-war in England, risen to be Chief of the General Staff in the kingdom of the United Netherlands, and then retired to study political economy.

In his writings he was a great critic of the 'perverted Liberalism' of Daendels and Raffles. He was a practical reformer rather than a philosopher, and as the founder of the Benevolent Society did much to relieve the appalling urban poverty in his own country by settling self-supporting colonies in the less cultivated districts of Friesland and Drente. In 1827 he was sent on a special mission to restore prosperity in the Dutch West Indies, and a year later returned with a report in which he showed how to make them yield a large annual profit to the mother country. This so impressed William that he appointed him as the successor to Du Bus de Gisignies in order that he might try out in the East Indies the ideas he had expounded.

The new governor-general landed in Java in January 1830 and proceeded at once to carry into effect a project that became known as the 'Culture System' (*Cultuur-stelsel*). In many ways it was the old system of forced deliveries and contingencies with a new look. The Javanese peasant was held to be too ignorant to make the best of his land; he must therefore be compelled to devote a portion of it to the cultivation of export crops as directed by the government, and the latter would take the product in lieu of land-rent in cash. The supplies thus raised were to be handled by Dutch merchants, shipped in Dutch vessels, and sold in the Netherlands, which would by this means become once more a world market for tropical produce. At the same time home industry was to be stimulated by being given a closed market in the colonies.

The principles of the system in its application to the cultivator were outlined thus by van den Bosch:<sup>1</sup>

1. Agreements are made with the people for setting apart a portion of their rice-fields for the cultivation of products suitable for the European market.
2. The portion set apart shall amount to one-fifth of the cultivated ground of each *desa*.
3. The cultivation of products suitable for the European market must not entail more labour than the cultivation of rice.
4. The land set apart is free of land-rent.
5. The cultivated product is delivered to the district, and whenever its assessed value is greater than the land-rent that has been remitted the difference is credited to the people.
6. Crop failure, when not due to lack of zeal or industry, is the government's liability.
7. The native works under the direction of his chiefs. Supervision by European officials is limited to the control of the working of the fields, the harvesting and transport of crops on time, and the finding of a suitable place.
8. The labour must be distributed in such a manner that a part of the people is responsible for bringing the crop to maturity, another part for harvesting it, a third for its transport, and a fourth for work in the factory, but the last only if there are insufficient free labourers available.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from the *Indisch Staatsblad* by Colenbrander, *Koloniale Geschiedenis*, iii, pp. 37-8.

9. Where the system still encounters difficulties in its practical application, freedom from land-rent shall be firmly maintained, and the people shall be considered to have discharged their obligation when they have brought the product to maturity; the harvesting and finishing shall then be the subject of separate agreements.

The system was introduced under favourable circumstances, for the Java War had brought much new territory under Dutch rule. Van den Bosch began with indigo and sugar. The Residents held conferences of heads of *desas* and elders and explained the system. Contracts were made with Chinese and Europeans to receive the produce for delivery to the government at fixed prices. The experiment was a success, and accordingly van den Bosch added coffee, tea, tobacco, pepper, cinnamon, cotton and cochineal to the list of products to be cultivated for the government. There was opposition to the scheme from the highest to the lowest, but the enormous cost of the Belgian war provided an unanswerable argument for its continuance. In 1832, therefore, van den Bosch was invested with dictatorial powers, and his system became 'the lifebelt on which the Netherlands kept afloat'. This unfortunately changed its character; it had come into being as an expedient for saving Java from bankruptcy. It now became one for saving Holland, and, in time, for enriching her at Java's expense.

From 1832 onwards the element of compulsion was increased. Each Residency must deliver export produce to the value of two guilders a head of its population. From January 1833 all coffee produced in addition to the government quota must be sold to the government at a fixed price. This was in direct contravention of the original promise that after the cultivator had satisfied the requirement to cultivate an agreed government product on one-fifth of his land he was free to do what he liked with the rest and could dispose of its produce how he liked. Moreover, although van den Bosch's third principle laid down that the cultivation of government products must not entail more labour than the cultivation of rice, in practice, since the cultures were in several cases new to the Javanese, they cost him more time and trouble than rice cultivation, and in any case the cultivation of coffee, sugar and indigo demanded more labour than rice.

The government in its need for money turned a blind eye to such things as these; in fact all the safeguards provided in the original scheme were thrown overboard. The European and native officials who superintended the system received a percentage of the products of their districts; hence they were anxious to raise the proceeds as high

as possible and used means forbidden by government decrees and promises to the people. For instance, often more than one-fifth of the acreage of a *desa* was set apart for government cultures, and the best land was chosen for the purpose. Worse still, the cultivator must cultivate government land before starting on his own. Food production therefore diminished because the Javanese had insufficient time to cultivate their own *sawahs*. For although van den Bosch laid down that a maximum of sixty-six days a year was necessary for labour on land set apart for government cultures, at least ninety days were required by coffee cultivation; and since the *heerendiensten* (forced labour) remained in force for the upkeep of roads and bridges, in some districts the cultivator had to work more than 200 days a year for the government. During the years 1848-50 there was widespread famine in central Java for this reason. Stapel suggests that the worst abuse lay in the fact that, in spite of the clear prohibition contained in the fourth and ninth principles, land-rent was collected almost without exception.

The financial results of the new system right from the start fulfilled expectations to the utmost. As early as 1833 a profit of 3 million guilders was paid to the Netherlands. It came to be known as the *batig saldo*, the surplus, and it has been estimated that in all the home country's exchequer benefited to the extent of some 900 million guilders. It was used for the repayment of the national debt and the construction of the Dutch railways. The Culture System also revived the fortunes of the *Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij*, which obtained the sole right to ship the government products to Holland. The Government of the Netherlands Indies shared in this prosperity, for under an arrangement known as the 'Consignment System' a portion of its proceeds had to be made over to the treasury at Batavia.

'The Culture System', writes Furnivall,<sup>1</sup> 'was succeeded by a Liberal reaction, and the writers of this school depicted it in its darkest colours; since then it has never been critically re-examined.' This fact has been too often overlooked by Dutch historians. 'The Indies gained nothing; but the consequences were prejudicial,' seems to reflect the general view. It is about as true as the statement that George III lost the American colonies. Under the Culture System the population of Java increased dramatically. The rice export figures show that its cultivation must have increased. There was a rise in the revenue from salt and bazaar dues, and a large increase in the import of cotton textiles. The introduction of many new export crops, and the experi-

<sup>1</sup> *Netherlands India*, p. 135.

mentation carried out by the Department of Agriculture, especially in tea cultivation, was of undoubted benefit to Java. None the less the view that this was a time of hardship for most Javanese villagers seems to be correct.

One must beware of generalizations. In some areas, notably East Java, where the officials paid as much attention to rice as to sugar, there was prosperity. In others, where they attended only to the cultivation of export crops and neglected rice, there was famine. There were good officials who thought in terms of the welfare of the people; unfortunately there were too many who allowed their commission on export crops, or their good repute with the government to dominate their outlook. From the point of view of Indonesia as a whole, during the period of the full application of the system, roughly from 1830 to 1860, two very serious charges may be levelled at Dutch rule. The Outer Possessions were neglected: the Dutch concentrated on Java more than ever, and in the middle of the century showed little concern for the other islands. They also failed to tackle systematically the vast problem of piracy.

It was the series of rice famines between 1843 and 1848 that first brought people up against the fact that something was seriously wrong. The trouble began in Cheribon, a rice-growing area, which under the Culture System was forced to produce coffee, sugar, indigo, tea and cinnamon. In 1843 rice was included among the export crops, and the tax on rice-land was collected in kind. This caused a serious famine and a large exodus of people. Other areas in central Java experienced even worse conditions in the succession of famines which followed. These caused an agitation against the system which little by little grew in intensity. Governor-General Rochussen was forced to reduce the cultures in the affected areas and did his utmost to see that van den Bosch's original instruction, that due attention should be paid to rice cultivation, was carried out.

But of far greater effect in the long run was the fundamental constitutional change that took place in Holland in 1848 under the influence of the revolutionary movements which shook all Europe during that year. A constitutional revision took away from the king the sole responsibility for the colonies and vested it in the States-General. This enabled the growing opposition to come to a head under the leadership of Baron van Hoëvell in the Second Chamber. Liberal opinion was that the system had been out of date by 1840. There was a long road to be travelled yet before it was finally abolished, and, some would say, before anything really effective was done to

mitigate its evils. But the chorus of voices demanding that the interests of the native peoples should be the first care of the government was rising; and notwithstanding a succession of reactionary governments at The Hague, the Colonial Opposition began to work out a constructive Liberal policy. This was in due course to sweep away a system which, as the antithesis of private enterprise, the Liberal panacea, was to their way of thinking 'rooted in unrighteousness'.

British protection to North Borneo and Sarawak, and in 1888 protectorate agreements were negotiated with them and with the sultan of Brunei. It was a guarantee of stability and security which all welcomed, the sultan not least, since he could now put up a more effective resistance to the greedy concession-hunting of which he had been the unwilling victim.

## CHAPTER 34

## THE DUTCH FORWARD MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

UNDER Article 59 of the Dutch constitutional revision of 1848, while the king was recognized as the supreme authority over the colonies the stipulation was added that a colonial constitution must be established by law, and that the chambers of the Dutch Parliament were to have specific rights of legislation over colonial currency and finance and such other matters as might be necessary. Article 60 laid down that the king must report annually on colonial affairs. These important changes in the relationship between the mother country and the colonies had at first very little effect upon conditions in the Indies. The Colonial Department was in the grip of officials with a conservative outlook, and the chambers for some time had too little knowledge of colonial affairs to exert any effective influence. But the *Regerings-reglement*, or Constitutional Regulation, which was passed in 1854 and came into effect in 1856, made one significant change in the colonial government by entrusting the chief power in the Indies to the governor-general and Council. This abolished the rule introduced in 1836, whereby the Council had been reduced to the position of a mere advisory body. Moreover, the Regulation looked forward to the ultimate abandonment of the Culture System and showed clearly that state cultivation was no longer to be fostered by the government. The governor-general was instructed to see that the cultures did not interfere with the production of adequate means of subsistence, and that the oppression connected with them was removed.

Still, the movement for reform moved incredibly slowly. Baron van Hoëvell, a past president of the Batavia Society of Arts and Sciences and the founder of the newspaper *Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch Indië*, who had stoutly opposed corruption in giving contracts in Java, was a member of the Second Chamber from 1849 to 1862. There he not only championed the cause of the Javanese people but helped to form what came to be known as the 'Colonial Opposition'. But for a long time the Conservatives dominated the home government and there was painfully little progress in actual reform.

In 1860 the struggle against the Culture System received new life as a result of two publications. One was a novel, *Max Havelaar*, written by Edward Douwes Dekker under the pseudonym of 'Multatuli'. In it Dekker tells the story of his career as an subordinate official in West Java who had been dismissed, according to his account, for defending the Javanese against the oppression practised against them under the Culture System. Quite apart from its propaganda value, it is a work of high literary value, one of the most striking contributions to Dutch prose literature in the nineteenth century. It stirred up wide support for the Liberal campaign against government control over cultures in Java. Its effect was enhanced by the pamphlets of Isaac Franssen van der Putte, and especially one entitled *The Regulation of Sugar Contracts in Java*. He had been employed by a sugar factory dealing with the product of cultures and had afterwards, as a tobacco planter in the extreme east of Java, become acquainted with free cultivation. He showed in his writings so intimate a knowledge of conditions there that in 1863 the Liberal leader Thorbecke appointed him Minister of Colonies in his Cabinet.

During van der Putte's term of office (1863-6) things began to move in the direction of free enterprise, the Liberal specific to end economic oppression. His own view was that direct taxation should take the place of deliveries under forced culture, and that private enterprise should have free access to land and labour. What he and his supporters did not advocate was the abolition of the infamous *batig saldo*. Moreover, the cultures that were abolished during this period—pepper in 1862, cloves and nutmeg in 1863, indigo, tea, cinnamon and cochineal in 1865, and tobacco in 1866—were no longer profitable. The forced culture of sugar and coffee, the chief source of Dutch profits, was retained. Some serious abuses, however, were removed. The percentage system, for instance, whereby European officials received commission on the proceeds of the forced cultures, was abolished, and it was forbidden for more than one-fifth of the cultivator's land to be used for government crops. A big step forward was made by the passage of the *Comptabiliteitswet* (Accounts Law) of 1864, which provided that from 1867 onwards the budget for the Indies must be passed annually by the home parliament. Another useful measure was the abolition in 1865 of compulsory labour in the forest districts.

De Waal's Sugar Law of 1870 represents the culminating point of the struggle against the Culture System. It provided that the government was to withdraw from sugar cultivation in twelve

annual stages beginning in 1878, and permitted the free sale of sugar in Java. Again one notes the exceptional caution shown by the Dutch in this matter, and the striking fact that coffee, which brought by far the greatest profit from the system, remained a forced culture until 1 January 1917. The same almost incredible slowness was shown in the case of the various profitable monopolies which inflicted so much hardship on the people. The revenue from the sale of these in the eighteen-forties was over 15 million guilders. A beginning was made by Governor-General van Twist (1851-6) by the abolition of the much-detested farming of bazaars, and fishery auctions. But the opium and pawn-shop farms, which were the most profitable, continued. By 1927 the gross revenue from the monopolies of opium, salt and pawnshops amounted to no less than 82.6 million guilders. It is obvious, therefore, that Dutch Liberalism differed very considerably from its contemporary Gladstonian Liberalism in Britain.

The Dutch outlook, in fact, in the matter of colonies was completely different from the British. Even the Liberals regarded them as a business concern, and their advocacy of private enterprise in place of government-controlled cultures was largely inspired by the desire of the individual Dutchman to have a greater share in the concern. More and more privately owned or run estates were coming into existence, and the private capitalists were demanding the removal of all restrictions to their activities. Van Twist, who was anxious to open up Java to private capital, allowed them to make collective contracts with the villages for labour. But the practice gave rise to such abuses, through advances of money to village headmen, that it had to be abolished in 1863. The truth was that the Liberals had two largely contradictory objects—to free the native from oppression and to make the Indies safe for the individual capitalist.

De Waal's Agrarian Law of 1870 ushered in the great age of private enterprise. It aimed at giving greater freedom and security to private enterprise by enabling capitalists to obtain from the government heritable leases for periods up to seventy-five years, and to hire land from native owners on short-term agreements subject to certain conditions. This opened the door for an immense expansion of private enterprise, and the export figures for plantation products are illuminating, as the following table shows:



COMPARATIVE VALUE OF STATE AND PRIVATE EXPORTS IN MILLIONS OF GUILDERS<sup>1</sup>

	State	Private
1856	64.4	34.3
1870	46.5	61.2
1875	41.4	130.7
1885	16.3	168.7

Even more important by comparison with what happened in French Indo-China and British Burma was the clause which prohibited the selling of land belonging to Indonesians to non-Indonesians. The immediate reason was that there was such a rush on the part of Europeans to cultivate culture products for the home market that there was a danger that land needed for the production of food stuffs for the native population would be used for other purposes.

In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened. The development of large-scale cultivation combined with the increasing use of steamships to produce a constant expansion of trade. It was in this period that the Netherlands Steam Navigation Company (1870) and the Rotterdam Lloyd (1875) were founded.

The development of Java between 1830 and 1870 is in striking contrast to the neglect of the Outer Possessions that characterizes the same period. The Java War followed by the struggle with Belgium prevented an energetic policy from being carried out. It was only with the greatest difficulty that General Coehus was able to muster adequate strength to bring the Padri wars to an end in 1837 with the siege and capture of Bondjol. Then the home government sent instructions that in the future there was to be as little interference as possible with the powers of the native chiefs outside Java. The native populations were thus left the victims of despotic or quarrelsome chiefs, who lost respect for a government which failed to intervene.

Worse still from the Dutch point of view were the activities of Raja James Brooke in Sarawak and Brunei and the acquisition of the island of Labuan by Britain. Governor-General Rochussen (1845-51) feared lest this might open the door for other powers to occupy parts of the Archipelago. He proposed, therefore, that Dutch power should be effectively established over the whole of Indonesia. For financial reasons alone the home government could not permit so ambitious a

<sup>1</sup> Taken from Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, p. 169.

scheme. It was willing to sanction a display of military powers where the circumstances warranted it, but the Batavian authorities pointed out that punitive expeditions were useless unless followed up by continuous occupation.

Nevertheless the establishment of British power in north-west Borneo did stir the Dutch to adopt a more energetic policy. The age of steam led to a search for coalfields, with rewarding results. Mines were opened in south-west Borneo near Banjermasin and in the east of the island at Kutei, and when the working of the Banjermasin mine led to a quarrel with the sultan and a war (1859-63) his dominions were annexed. The Dutch were taking no chances in that region. In 1854 and 1855 they intervened to stop the disorders in the sultanates of Sambas and Pontianak caused by the feuds between the Chinese gold-mining kongsis. Moreover, the discovery of rich tin deposits in the island of Billiton led to its occupation in 1851 and the exploitation of its tin by the Billiton Tin Company.

Elsewhere there was enough activity to make it clear that the Dutch were becoming more and more aware of the need to maintain a dominant position in the Archipelago, if only to prevent outside interference. They were worried by the proud, independent attitude of the rulers of Bali, whose internecine war and slave trade went on unchecked. Dutch expeditions to the island in 1846 and 1849 encountered fierce resistance. In consequence of the latter they annexed some territory, and the chiefs of the remainder made formal recognition of Holland's suzerainty. The Bugis rulers in Celebes also gave much trouble, and there was heavy fighting in 1858 and 1859 against Boni before Dutch authority was made more or less dominant over the south-west parts of the island, mainly through the loyalty of the dynasty of the Aru Palaccas. But more trouble was to come later.

It was on Sumatra, however, that Dutch attention came to be chiefly focused as time went by. Piracy and the slave-trade were rife in Aceh, Palembang, Bencoolen and the Lampongs. From 1856 onwards the Dutch began a series of moves designed to bring more and more of the island under control. In that year the Lampongs districts were subdued. Two years later the Batak districts received similar treatment, and in 1868 Bencoolen. Palembang had been brought under direct Dutch rule in 1825, but like Bencoolen had become a prey to disorder. So Dutch control had to be tightened there. Siak gave the Dutch a severe shock in 1856 when its sultan, at loggerheads with his brother, the vice-sultan, called in the help of an Englishman named Wilson, who enlisted a force of Bugis in Singapore, defeated

the vice-sultan and took control over the state. The Dutch had to send a warship to enforce his expulsion. Then in 1858 they made a treaty with the sultan whereby his state and its dependencies—Deli, Serdang, Langkat and Assahan—came under their sovereignty. The acquisition of this territory to the north of Siak was an immense step forward for Dutch power on the east coast of Sumatra. Soon European enterprise was to make a start there with tobacco-planting, which was to make that region one of the richest districts in the Netherlands Indies.

But the Siak Treaty brought strained relations with Aceh, which claimed the state as one of its dependencies. The weak spot there was that Aceh was not strong enough to control effectively the places over which she made such claims, though they had at one time recognized her overlordship. The way in which the Dutch enforced their control over these places affected adversely the trade that had long been carried on by the merchants of Singapore and Malacca, and their loud complaints forced the British government to take action. Its protest at The Hague led to the negotiations which produced the epoch-making treaty of 1871, dealt with in the previous chapter. With its signature a new period of Dutch expansion in Indonesia begins. It was happily one in which, with the passage of van der Putte's Tariff Law abolishing differential rates of customs duties between Dutch and foreign trade, better relations grew up between Holland and Britain.

Acheh, the sworn enemy of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, had become under Sultan Iskander early in the seventeenth century a powerful state ruling much of Sumatra. After his death the kingdom declined. In the nineteenth century it was divided into several states under practically independent chiefs. The sultan's capital was at the present town of Kutaraja; his main revenues came from port dues. The Treaty of London (1824) had given the Dutch the task of safeguarding the seas around Aceh against piracy, but they argued with cogency that as the Achinese were the chief pirates there they could not carry out their task satisfactorily without occupying the principal ports of the country. Under the treaty they could not do so because they had undertaken to respect the sovereignty of the state. The number of piratical attacks on shipping—off Sumatra's west coast in particular—was legion, and British, Dutch, American and Italian ships were plundered.

Matters came to a head through the attempts of the sultan to obtain foreign aid against the Dutch. His application to the Porte failed

because Turkey at the time needed European help against the threat of Russia. After the treaty of 1871 the Government of Batavia made an attempt to settle matters with Aceh by negotiation. The sultan sent an embassy for talks with the Dutch Resident on the island of Riau. On its return journey the mission stopped at Singapore, where the envoys entered into secret discussions with the American and Italian consuls. The Italian consul turned down their proposals, but the American consul-general, Mr. Studer, drafted with the envoys the preliminaries of a commercial treaty. The Dutch consul-general sent to Batavia what later turned out to be a false report that Studer had asked for warships to be despatched to the Sumatran coast to protect American interests. This led to a sharp passage of arms between The Hague and the American Secretary of State. It led also to a final attempt on the part of Batavia to obtain an agreement with the sultan, and, when the latter's attitude proved uncompromising, to a declaration of war.

The war proved to be one of the longest and toughest in Dutch colonial history. It also attracted more public interest in Holland than any previous colonial struggle. It began in April 1873 with the despatch of a small Dutch expeditionary force, which was too weak for its task and had to withdraw. In December of the same year a larger one under General van Swieten landed in Aceh and in a few weeks captured the sultan's kraton. When, shortly afterwards, he died operations were suspended in the hope that his successor would sign a treaty accepting Dutch sovereignty subject to a guarantee of his autonomy in internal affairs. Instead, however, the Dutch found themselves faced by a general revolt, in which the local chiefs and the religious leaders everywhere took the lead. Guerrilla fighting became the order of the day, and the Dutch found themselves faced by a seemingly insoluble problem. When they won a few successes and tried to negotiate, the fighting would break out afresh. Their troops were decimated by cholera, and the hands of their commanders were tied by orders from above to limit military operations as far as possible.

Between 1878 and 1881 General Karel van der Heyden forced so many chiefs to submit that Batavia jumped to the conclusion that the resistance was broken. It began, therefore, to set up civil government. The decision was a disastrous one; the fighting flared up again with all its old vigour, and the religious leaders proclaimed a holy war against the infidel.

The Dutch had once again to pour into the country a very large force and undertake immensely costly operations. As a measure of

economy it was decided to concentrate the forces in a strong defensive position, and a line of strong-points connected by a railway was established, stretching across from the east to the west coast in the form of a ring covering Kutaraja. The system was completed in March 1885 and the Dutch troops were withdrawn behind it, not without suffering severe casualties. But the hope that this would enable the Dutch to negotiate from strength a plan for the restoration of the sultanate proved vain, since the chiefs looked upon the new defensive system as a sign of weakness.

Meanwhile the years were slipping by and Dutch policy changed with each new governor of Kutaraja. Governor Demmeni tried pacification by lifting the naval blockade of the coastal regions; but this only made matters worse. His successor, van Teijn (1886-91), reversed this policy and coerced many of the chiefs into submission. Pompe van Meerdervoort, who next held office for a few months (1891-2), reverted to the policy of leniency; the Achinese response, however, convinced Batavia that only by force could a solution be achieved. But how could force be employed with effect?

Colonel Deykerhoff, who took office in January 1892, believed that the best method was to win over a powerful chief and provide him with the supplies necessary to enable him to conquer the recalcitrant. In 1893 Tuku Uma, a chief who had submitted, was taken into the pay of the government and allowed to form a well-armed legion of 250 men. His operations were successful, and the Dutch forces occupied the reconquered districts and established a new line. Then suddenly in March 1896 he with his legion went over to the enemy.

The Dutch now realized that nothing short of an all-out effort of conquest would suffice. Two books of a very different size and nature, which achieved a wide circulation at this time, helped to put an end to hesitancy. The first, *De Atjehers*, written by the famous Arabic scholar Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, appeared in 1893. It was in the form of a report put together by him as a result of a visit to Achch in 1891-2. Quite apart from its influence upon the conflict through its advocacy of strong measures, the book has immense intrinsic value as a description of native customs and institutions. It is a classical work of cultural anthropology.

The other book was a brochure written by Major Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz, who had been van Teijn's chief of staff. In it he explained the methods which he advocated for the complete conquest of the country, without using more troops than were already in occupation of the 'concentrated system'.

But before a forward move could be made the damage caused by Tuku Uma's treachery had to be repaired. The whole populace, both within and without the *Geconcentreerde Linie*, as it was called, had gone over to his side. General Vetter, who took command in April 1896, commenced a series of large-scale operations with a greatly augmented army which by March of the following year gave him control over the area terrorized by Tuku Uma and forced the latter to flee to Daya on the west coast. Van Heutsz played a distinguished part in these operations, and it was finally decided to put him in charge of the whole campaign. In March 1898 he was appointed Governor of Achch, with Snouck Hurgronje as his adviser for native affairs.

Heutsz completely revolutionized the morale of the Dutch troops. His first operations resulted in the conquest of the district of Pidië, the very heart of the rebellion, where the claimant to the sultanate, Tuku Uma, and Panglima Polem, another leader, had joined forces. By the beginning of 1899 the Dutch dominated Achch proper and the rebellious chiefs were being chased into the outer territories of the Gayo and Alas lands. Early in the year Tuku Uma, a fugitive since the conquest of Pidië, was ambushed on the west coast and killed. During that year and the following one all resistance was crushed and large-scale operations were abandoned. Lightly armed flying columns were then organized alike for the maintenance of internal peace and the harassing of the chiefs who still held out. Repeated expeditions of this sort had to be sent to the Gayo lands, where the claimant to the sultanate had taken refuge. In January 1903 he made his submission, and at about the same time the great Panglima Polem surrendered.

The final operations were then handed over by van Heutsz to Lieutenant-Colonel van Daalen. In June 1904, when van Heutsz left Achch to become governor-general, most of the more important chiefs had submitted, but the opposition had still not been stamped out. Insurrections—some of them serious—continued until 1908, and were only brought to an end by the exile of the claimant to the sultanate and a number of other chiefs to Amboina. Even then it was necessary to maintain military government for another ten years.

The outbreak of the war had caused something like a sensation in the Islamic world, and, followed as it was by the victories of the Mahdi of Kordofan in the Sudan, played its part in stimulating a revival of Muslim fanaticism in Africa and Arabia. Thousands of Indonesian pilgrims went to Mecca annually, and Snouck Hurgronje found a large colony of 'Djawahs' in the holy city when he visited it in 1885. Hence

one essential element in the pacification of Aceh was for the Dutch to cultivate good relations with Mecca. This they did by encouraging the pilgrimages which brought such profits to the Meccans, and by appointing an Indonesian vice-consul as the representative of Batavia there.

The Dutch forward movement in the latter part of the nineteenth century did not confine itself to the task of conquering northern Sumatra, heavy though it proved to be. Notwithstanding the opposition of the home authorities to any expansion of territory there, much was done to open up the Outer Possessions. Governor-General Lansberge (1875-81) gave much attention to the Moluccas and the Lesser Sunda Islands, where piracy, wrecking and the slave trade were still rife. Much also was done to consolidate the Dutch hold on the rest of Sumatra outside the Aceh territories. They were constantly apprehensive of attempts by foreign powers to establish settlements in their preserves, and kept an eagle eye on the small islands fringing Sumatra. In the interior, to the south of Lake Toba, the work of the Rhenish Missionary Society in converting the Battak region of Silindung caused strife with the Padri sect, and in 1878 Si Singa Mangaraja, a local chieftain who threatened the Christians, was driven out by the Dutch and a new Residency, Tapanuli, formed.

Bali, which had taught the Dutch expensive lessons on the subject of interference with its independence, caused Batavia much heart-burning from time to time owing to its cruel oppression of the Sasaks of Lombok, who were Mahomedans. A general rebellion broke out in 1891, and after fruitless attempts at mediation a Dutch expedition in 1894 established control over Lombok. This marked the final abandonment of the policy of non-intervention. Van Heutsz in 1898 had introduced a new system in Aceh, known as the 'Short Declaration', whereby a chief who recognized the authority of Batavia was confirmed in his rule. In the period up to 1911 this was used so extensively that some 300 self-governing states came under Dutch control. It was during this period that the remainder of Bali was brought to heel.

The extension of Dutch rule in these territories resulted in an immense amount of survey and development work. The Topographical Service laid out roads and mapped previously uncharted regions. Experts carried out researches into the manner of life, the customs and religion of the various peoples, as well as into the nature of the soil and of the vegetable and animal life. The expeditions of A. W. Nieuwenhuis to the interior of Borneo (1893-8) and the

researches of the Swiss scholars Paul and Fritz Sarasin in Celebes (1893-1903), under the auspices of the Royal Netherlands Geographical Society, opened the way for trade and industry and made valuable contributions to knowledge.

From 1870 onwards the economic development of the Netherlands Indies was impressive. Much land previously cultivated for the state was handed over to private planters; there was a rush to produce sugar, and many new factories were built. Tobacco-growing also expanded rapidly. Coffee held its own, and copra, palm-oil, fibres, pepper, cassava, kapok, tea and cocoa provided important exports to world markets. Save for the sugar factories there was little large-scale industry. The most important native industries to survive the competition of European manufactured goods were pottery, spinning, and weaving.

Construction on the first railways—from Semarang to Surakarta and from Batavia to Buitenzorg—was begun in the 'sixties, but the two lines were not completed until 1873. The planters everywhere clamoured for railways, and in 1875 a state railway to open up the sugar area from Surabaya to Malang was begun. At about the same time the strategic line in Aceh was constructed. In 1883 the prosperous Deli Tobacco Company began to build a railway on the east coast of Sumatra, and in 1887 a state railway was constructed between the Ombilin coalfield and Padang. Between 1890 and 1900 much greater progress was made and the total length rose from 1,600 to 3,500 kilometres.

The first inland telegraph service was opened in 1856, and the inland postal service commenced operations in 1866. In the next period the greatest progress was made with the development of telephonic communications. The first telephone company was founded in 1882, to be followed in the next few years by no less than thirty-four more. The state thereupon intervened in 1898 and took over the whole service.

The opening of the Suez Canal and the freeing of the sugar trade wrought a revolution in the Dutch shipping trade. The Dutch sailing ships had to face the competition of steamships, mostly flying the English flag. Even the Netherlands-Indies Steamship Company was linked up with the British-India Steam Navigation Company and all its repair work executed at Singapore. The Dutch therefore had to set about building an entirely new fleet; and although the Netherlands Steamship Company was founded in 1870, it had for many years to buy its steamers from abroad and engage foreigners to run them.

Until 1891, when the last contract of the Netherlands-Indies Company expired, it enjoyed a practical monopoly of the inter-island traffic. Then the contract was transferred to the Koninklijk Paketvaart Maatschappij, which had been founded in 1888.

The growth of steamship traffic called for a vast improvement in harbour facilities. In 1873 a beginning was made on building a new harbour for Batavia at Tanjung Priok. This was completed in 1893. By that time similar work was going ahead at Surabaya, Macassar, Belawan, Emmahaven (for Padang) and Sabang.

In 1883 the first concession for the exploitation of petroleum was made to the Royal Netherlands Company. Oil had then been discovered in paying quantities in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo. But it was not until the next century that the great advances were made. The development of coal-mining, however, made great progress during the second half of the nineteenth century in western Sumatra, south Borneo and the Palembang area. Efforts to persuade private capital to exploit the tin that was found in great quantities in Banka, Billiton and Singkep met with little response, notwithstanding the rich profits made by the largely government-owned Billiton Company, which was founded in 1852. The Singkep Company was founded in 1889, but achieved little during its early years.

The results of all this progress, expressed in terms of imports and exports, show the export trade more than doubled in value between 1870 and 1900, and the import trade quadrupled. The total value of exports rose from 107.57 million guilders in 1870 to 258.23 million in 1900; that of imports rose from 44.45 million guilders to 176.07 million over the same period. The great feature in the expansion of imports lay in the fact that it was mainly accounted for by such goods as fertilizers, iron, steel, machinery and tools, which all tended to enhance Indonesia's productive capacity.

## CHAPTER 35

## THE REIGN OF BODAWPAYA AND THE FIRST ANGL0-BURMESE WAR, 1782-1826

THE king known to history as Bodawpaya used a great variety of titles during his own reign. The one which came to be most commonly applied was Mintayagyi Paya, 'Lord of the Great Law'. He was the third son of Alaungpaya and possibly the ablest statesman of his line. But Michael Symes, who was twice deputed to his Court as the representative of the Government of India, described him as 'a child in his ideas, a tyrant in his principles, and a madman in his actions'. His long reign, which lasted until 1819, had a decisive influence upon his country's history.

It began with a blood-bath, in which he made a clean sweep of all possible rivals in the royal family. But a brother who escaped the ceremonial massacre plotted with Maha Thihathura, one of Hsinbyushin's most distinguished generals, to overthrow him. This caused a second blood-bath, in which they, with every member of their families and all their servants, were done to death. Late in the same year 1782 a pretender, Nga Myat Pon, who claimed descent from the Toungoo dynasty, scaled the palace walls with 200 desperate men. He and his band were overcome and killed by the palace guard. Then the district of Paungga near Sagaing, where they had hatched their plot, was punished by the destruction of every living thing—human beings, animals, fruit trees and standing crops—save for a few people who were made pagoda slaves.

To atone for so much bloodshed the king built a new pagoda at Sagaing. He also abandoned the palace at Ava, fearing that it had come under an evil spell. A new royal city was laid out at Amarapura, about six miles north-east of Ava, and thither the Court was transferred with due ceremonial in May 1783. In the following September Mons of the Bassein province made a surprise attack on Rangoon, which they captured and held for a time, intending to revive their old monarchy. A Burmese counter-attack was successful, and the city was retaken after desperate fighting—only just in time, for it soon became obvious that a much wider movement had been nipped in the bud.

number of protests, and when in July Britain and Tibet signed an agreement, the Chinese delegate withheld his signature. In the Kachin country the British established military police posts from Namkhan northwards along the Irrawaddy-Salween watershed. Hence, in response to Ch'en Yu-k'o's agitation, Sir Hugh Stephenson, Governor of Burma, on 8 January 1934 announced the extension of British-Indian control over the Triangle. And there the matter rested until after the Pacific War of 1941-5.

## CHAPTER 45

THE DUTCH 'NEW COURSE' AND NATIONALISM IN  
INDONESIA, 1900-42

By 1900 Dutch opinion on colonial affairs had come to regard liberalism as out of date. It was obvious that the supporters of private enterprise cared little about the interests of the Indonesians, and that the immense power that private capital had come to wield was in the hands of a few great corporations able to take common action in defence of their interests—the 'over-mighty subjects', in truth, of modern times. Dr. Abraham Kuyper, who became prime minister in 1901, was the writer of a pamphlet published in 1880, *Ons Program*, in which he argued that the government must adopt a policy of moral responsibility for native welfare. This idea he incorporated in the 'Speech from the Throne' of that year. Thus was launched what became known as the 'Ethical Policy'.

The first Socialists had by this time entered the Dutch parliament and were loudly proclaiming the doctrine of 'Government of the Indies for the Indies', with their eyes open to the ultimate aim of self-government. But a far deeper impression was made by the Liberal C. Th. van Deventer, who not only drafted a new programme for his party, advocating welfare, decentralization and the greater employment of Indonesians in the administration, but in 1899 caused a sensation by his article *Een Eereschuld* ('A debt of honour'), in which he argued that all the money drawn from the Indies under the *batig saldo* since 1867, when parliament assumed responsibility for the finances of the Indies, should be repaid.

So once more, after a tremendous outpouring of noble sentiment, a programme of 'decentralization' and native welfare was set in motion, with the same almost incredible hesitation that had marked the abandonment of the Culture System. 'Decentralization' was the new gospel. It envisaged the delegation of powers from The Hague to Batavia, from the governor-general to departments and local officers, and from European to Indonesian officers. It also meant the establishment of autonomous organs managing their own affairs in co-operation with the government. In practice, however, the Decentralization Law of 1903 and the decrees of 1904-5 creating local councils

composed of Indonesians, Europeans and Chinese went nothing like as far as the decentralization scheme which Governor-General Mijer had submitted to the home government as far back as 1867. And up to the outbreak of the First World War, which cut off Batavia's communications with The Hague, the governor-general remained completely under the control of the home government.

In 1905 the Deputy Director of the Civil Service, de Graaff, raised the question of the substitution of Indonesians for Europeans and the unification of the two services, in connection with his proposal for a reform of Java's territorial organization which would give local officers greater power. But for the time being it was side-tracked. In 1914, he submitted a wider scheme embracing the reorganization of the whole of the Indies into twelve governments, each with a degree of financial autonomy. This also was shelved, but his plan to give Indonesian officers greater powers—the word actually used was *ontvoogding*, 'emancipation'—was generally approved. Nothing, however, was done until 1921, when it was laid down that certain concessions might be made to regents in recognition of special merit. But the first regent to be 'emancipated' declared that it made no difference whatever to his position, and for another ten years, in the words of Raden Djajadiningrat, 'the European administration remained just as before'.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the promoters of the 'ethical policy' had turned to the village as the lever for the improvement of native welfare. Beginning with de Graaff's Village Regulation of 1906, which provided for a Village Government, comprising the headman and village officers, and a Village Gathering competent to regulate village institutions and provide for its requirements, measures were taken to improve agricultural production and veterinary care, to establish village schools, provide sound credit and promote public health. The most elaborate village administration was built up. But it was an instrument for such excessive interference from above that there was hardly any village autonomy left, and the general effect was to turn villages against Dutch rule. The Dutch method has been described by Mr. Furnivall as 'let me help you, let me show you how to do it, let me do it for you'.<sup>2</sup>

The first signs of an awakening national self-consciousness began to show themselves in Java early in the century. Such external

<sup>1</sup> *Indonesische Genootschap*, 1929, p. 83, quoted by J. S. Furnivall in *Netherlands India*, p. 269.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 389.

influences as the Boxer Rising in China, the Filipino revolt against Spain, and the rise of Japan undoubtedly played their part, for they had a marked effect on the minds of little groups of *literate* in the various countries of South-East Asia, who were worried by the inferior status accorded to them under Western domination. It was significant that in 1899 Japan claimed, and received, equal rights with Europeans



RADEN ADJENG KARTINI

in the Netherlands Indies. But in each country the nationalist movement took on a special character of its own.

In Indonesia the predominance of Java, with two-thirds of the total population crowded into one-fifteenth of the total area, was a marked feature of its early stages. Cultural factors here were active, an increased awareness of the value of Javanese culture with its roots deeply in the far-distant past, and a demand for the spread of education, regarding which the Dutch had shown themselves woefully negligent before the twentieth century. A new chapter in the native movement opened with the emergence in 1900 of the gifted Raden Adjeng

Kartini, daughter of the Regent of Japara, as a champion of education for women. Her letters,<sup>1</sup> published in 1911, stimulated the release of a native spiritual energy which led to the foundation of Kartini schools for girls. Both she and Dr. Waidin Sudira Usada, a retired medical officer, who began a campaign for the advancement of Java in 1906, looked to the spread of Western education as the means of salvation.

In 1908 Usada founded the first nationalist association, Budi Utomo ('High Endeavour'), with a membership mainly of intellectuals and Javanese officials. It aimed at organizing schools on a national basis and took its inspiration from the Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, and to some extent from Mahatma Gandhi. It was followed in 1911 by an association of a very different character, Sarekat Islam, which was an offshoot of an Islamic revival among Sumatrans and Javanese, resulting from an intensification of Christian missionary enterprise. Sarekat Islam made its first appearance, however, as a combination of Javanese *batik* traders against Chinese exploitation. Its four original aims were announced as the promotion of Indonesian commercial enterprise, mutual economic support, the intellectual and material well-being of Indonesians and the true religion of Islam. It rapidly became a popular movement, and within a quarter of a century had a membership of two millions. 'Islam was the bond and symbol of common action against other nationalities', writes Colenbrander.<sup>2</sup> At its first congress, held at Surabaya in January 1913, its leader, Omar Said Tjokro Aminoto, asserted forcibly that it was not directed against Dutch rule, and that it would pursue its aims in a constitutional manner. Its first nation-wide congress was held in 1916, when representatives of 80 local societies with a membership of 360,000 attended and passed a resolution demanding self-government on the basis of union with the Netherlands.

Meanwhile Socialism had made its appearance not only among Indonesians but also among the Indos, or Dutch Eurasians. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had immediate effects upon the situation in Java. Hendrik Sneevliet formed the Indian Social Democratic Club with revolutionary aims, and Semaun, one of its members, strove to win over Sarekat Islam to Communism. At the National Congress of October 1917 at Batavia Tjokro Aminoto changed his tone to one of hostility to the government, though he still recommended

<sup>1</sup> The Dutch edition is entitled *Door duisternis tot licht. Gedachten over en voor het Javaansche volk*. There is an English edition entitled *Letters of a Javanese Princess by Raden Adjeng Kartini*, New York, 1920. She died in 1904 aged twenty-five.

<sup>2</sup> *Koloniale Geschiedenis*, iii, p. 129.

constitutional action. There was strong disappointment at the postponement of the establishment of the long-promised Volksraad, and with the limitation imposed by the Dutch upon franchise regulations. War was declared on 'sinful capitalism'. But Semaun, who had organized an energetic Communist section (Section B) closely in touch with Moscow, failed to gain control of the movement and broke away to form the Perserikatan Komunier India (P.K.I.), which joined the Third International of Moscow. An outbreak of passive resistance in the Preanger in July 1919, coming after an ugly incident in central Celebes in which the Dutch controller and some officials lost their lives, led to an enquiry, which showed that secret societies belonging to Section B were involved, and it was thereupon dissolved by the government.

The struggle was now between the P.K.I. and Sarekat Islam, and the religious question was the main issue. P.K.I.'s second congress in 1920 decided that Communism was just as much opposed to Pan-Islamism as it was to Western domination. Communism, however, was not a mass movement, and the Communists, though exceptionally energetic and intelligent, were few in number. Hence their tactics were to attempt to steal their influence from the leaders of Sarekat Islam and to win over the trade unions. And Tan Malaka, a Communist leader exiled for inciting a strike of government pawnshop employees, went to Moscow and tried to persuade the Comintern to accept Pan-Islamism.

When the sixth national congress of Sarekat Islam met in October 1921 at Surabaya, Tjokro Aminoto was under arrest because of his connection with underground activities, and Abdul Muis and Hadji Agus Salim, who presided in his place, carried a motion forbidding members of the Sarekat to belong to any other party. This forced the Communists out of the movement. But for five years Sarekat Islam fought a losing fight against the relatively small group of Communists who went ahead organizing Sarekats of their own, supporting strikes and making preparations for revolutionary action in parts of northern and western Java. In 1922, under the influence of young Indonesian graduates from Europe, who were discontented with their status in the government services, Sarekat Islam established relations with the Indian National Congress and adopted the policy of non-co-operation.

The years 1923-6 saw a series of revolutionary attempts. The post-war depression, with its crop of industrial disputes, presented the extremists with excellent opportunities for bringing about the



maximum dislocation of political and economic life in the hope that it would enable them to seize power. Moscow at the time regarded Java as a strategic centre of the highest importance. Through agents in Singapore contact was made between the P.K.I. and the Chinese Communist Party. For the time being the Communists became the most vital force in the Indonesian movement, and lawlessness and intimidation were the order of the day. Against this Sarekat Islam became increasingly hostile and turned more and more to religion as a means of combating Communism.

The P.K.I., with a large following among the trade unions, organized a railway strike in May 1923 which caused the government to amend the penal code by providing heavy penalties for action likely to dislocate economic life. But the policy of repression only encouraged the spread of revolutionary views. In 1925 a strike in the metal industry was forcibly suppressed. In the following year, encouraged by vague promises of assistance from Zinoviev and Bucharin, the Communist leaders tried to start a revolution in West Java and Sumatra. The operations were described as carefully planned and widespread. Nevertheless they were easily suppressed, and before the measures of severe repression taken by the Dutch the whole revolutionary movement collapsed. The Communist Party was banned, Communist meetings prohibited and about 1,300 members of the party interned in New Guinea. Communism was not entirely suppressed, but its leadership of the Indonesian movement was ended and a new phase in the history of that movement began.

The failure of the revolutionary movement left Sarekat Islam as the main organ of nationalism, though by this time a multiplicity of parties had arisen—some local, such as Sarekat-Ambon, Perserikatan-Minahasa and the Sumatranen-Bond; others based upon the division of political parties in Holland; and still others, such as the Indo-European League and various Chinese societies, representing special communal interests. Sarekat Islam now began to pay more attention to education and economic conditions. It put great energy into the foundation of 'wild' schools and co-operative institutions. This kind of work, however, did not satisfy the aspirations of the discontented students of the Indonesian Club in Holland. Through their influence and under the leadership of Djipto Mangun Kusuma, the leader of the Bandung Study Group, and of Sukarno, a popular young demagogue of incorruptible character, a new political party, Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia, came into being in 1927. It sought to rally all the existing nationalist organizations behind a big non-co-operation

movement on the Gandhi model. But when Sukarno began to show revolutionary tendencies he and two of his helpers were jailed in December 1929, and once more the extremist attempt to capture the nationalist movement failed; as a political force it came to an end for the time being. New leaders interested in social service and social justice came forward. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro ('teacher of all the gods'),<sup>1</sup> to use the pseudonym he adopted as a public man, went ahead with the planning and development of national education, while Dr. Sutomo, who as a young medical student had been associated with Dr. Sudira Usada in founding Budi Utomo, directed the energies of the National Party into various types of constructive activity, and in particular the struggle to free the peasantry from the tyranny of the usurer.

Much of the trouble of these post-war years was the result of dis-appointment at Dutch unwillingness to effect any real transfer of power. During the First World War, in response to insistent nationalist demands for a greater share in the government, a scheme for a Volksraad was passed by the Netherlands Parliament in 1916, and what has been called an experiment in self-government<sup>2</sup> held its first meeting in May 1918. Half of its members were elected by local and city councils, and half were appointed by the governor-general. It was in no real sense a representative body, it had a European majority, and its powers were limited to the offering of advice, which the governor-general could not accept without authorization from The Hague. At its first meeting the disappointed deputies rejected a proposal to address a loyal cable to the queen in token of gratitude. And although under the Constitution (*Staatsinrichting*) of 1925 its numbers were raised from forty-eight to sixty-one and it was given an elective majority, Indonesians received only thirty seats and its financial and legislative powers remained very slight, if indeed they can be dignified by the name of 'powers'.

The reformed Volksraad must be seen in relation to the general scheme of decentralization introduced by the Constitution of 1925. A new system of provincial government was devised above the residencies. As a first step Java's twenty-two residencies were in 1929 combined so as to form three provinces, and each under a governor assisted by a partly elected council with a non-European majority. Regency councils also were created, and these, together with the existing town councils, formed the electorates for both the Volksraad

<sup>1</sup> Raden Mas Suwardi Suryaningrat; he belonged to the princely house of Paku Alam.

<sup>2</sup> Vlekke, *Nusantara*, p. 346.

and the provincial councils. Outside Java, in areas where the political development of the population was considered too backward for any form of self-government, 'governments' without representative councils were established instead of provinces. The new system was a long time in taking shape and was only completed shortly before the Japanese invasion. It represented the utmost concessions the Dutch were prepared to make before the coming of the deluge.

Dutch policy, like Conservative policy in Ireland in the 'nineties, was to 'kill home rule by kindness'. The energy and enthusiasm in the cause of economic and social welfare shown by Dutch administrators was quite outstanding. Their comparative lack of success was due chiefly to the phenomenal rise in the population of Java and the opposition of private interests in both Holland and Indonesia. But the effects of the great depression of the early nineteen-thirties led them to encourage native industry; and when the revival of trade and industry began, a spirit of greater co-operation began also to show itself between Dutch and Indonesians.

But though the political atmosphere was less heated, the Indonesian movement continued to cherish its two aims of economic self-sufficiency and political self-government with unabated fervour. In 1936 the Volksraad passed a motion asking the Netherlands government to call an imperial conference to discuss the method by which self-government should come into effect, and to fix a time-limit. It was characteristic of Dutch policy that no real response to this request was made until July 1941, when Queen Wilhelmina and her government were refugees in London. Under such a chastening experience it was only natural that she should promise to hold such a conference immediately after the war. But without undue scepticism the doubt may be expressed whether in 1941 the Dutch government had the serious intention of ever granting Indonesia real self-government.

Like the French in Indo-China, the Dutch were not enthusiasts for native education beyond the elementary stage. Fear of stimulating popular discontent made them slow in providing secondary and higher education. The pressure exerted by Sarekat Islam practically forced them to improve the Dutch-vernacular schools and thereby create a demand for more advanced education. In response to this M.U.L.O. (More Extended Lower Instruction) Schools were founded, and in 1919 General Middle Schools, which provided courses in Western languages, mathematics, science and oriental literature leading up to university entrance. But the rate of progress in the provision of schools of this type was too slow for the nationalists, who tried to fill

in the gaps by establishing 'wild' schools literally by the thousand. The inefficiency of most of these, coupled with the fact that many of them were used for the purpose of spreading political discontent, compelled the government to take them more and more under its control. Hence, when provincial councils were created, education was not one of the subjects transferred to them.

From 1907 onwards immense efforts were put into the foundation of village schools. The practice was for the village, or group of villages, to build the school, often with materials provided free of cost by the government, and to contribute ninety guilders annually towards its upkeep. The government provided the teachers and textbooks. Parents were expected to pay a few cents a month, but were usually exempted, since pressure had to be brought on many of them to send their children. By 1930 there were more than 1½ million at these schools. But they were so closely controlled that they were organs of the central government rather than of the village communities. Perhaps the most paternal feature of the whole system was its extremely efficient provision of reading matter not only for the children but for popular consumption as a whole.

The extremely tardy development of higher education must be understood in the light of the few opportunities that existed outside government service for Indonesians with specialist qualifications. In their early years few Indonesians qualified for entrance to the Bandung Technical College opened in 1919, the Law College in 1924, the Medical College in 1926, and the government institutions teaching agriculture and forestry. In 1941, when the University of Batavia (now the University of Indonesia) was formed, its enrolment of Indonesian students was small. The instruction given at these institutions maintained the very best traditions of Dutch scholarship, but from a British point of view it was instruction rather than education. There were no hostels for students coming from a long distance, and no community life such as similar British institutions fostered.

Notwithstanding the great strides taken by the Dutch to extend education in Indonesia under the 'New Course', the annual budget allotment, compared with the Philippines, was very small. Moreover, the provision of education failed to keep pace with the rise of population, and the number of illiterates was actually greater in 1940 than it had been at the beginning of the century.