**Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency, Victoria Nolan, 2012**

* Initial British response in Malaya too weak; “This initial approach focused on restoring law and order, and the government and military were slow to realise the situation in Malaya was more than this” 82
* Templer – vast power key to his success? “Templer therefore had control of the government and civil elements of the administration of Malaya” 85.
* Importance of leaders in a ‘small wars’ situation; “in the context of military leaders involved in undertaking small wars, a certain approach and culture can be promoted by commanders through what they focus on, how they manage critical situations, what they channel resources into…” 87
* Learning and change in methods of fighting insurgents; “junior leaders of the ground were beginning to realise that a different approach was required…through use of small groups and tracking techniques” 88
* Failure in phase one due to lack of intel; “intelligence gathering was not coordinated, and there was little emphasis on interpreting it in order to target specific insurgent groups” 89
* Even in Phase One British realised battle for Hearts and Minds (H+M) of local population was key; “Gurney…realised that without the support of the local population the insurgents would find it increasingly difficult to sustain their campaign” 90.
* Initial failure in phase one due to poor leadership; “In this first phase, therefore, the actions taken by leaders to counter the insurgency were ineffective” 90.
* Briggs plan; Key idea to integrate the Civil / military / intel together to make an effective fighting force; pg.91. (“the triumvirate of Civil-military-police”)
* Templer approach – took Briggs plan even further, all emcompassing approach “his emphasis on fighting the insurgency on all fronts (political, social, military, economic and so on) and the importance of a long-term political solution, made all the difference in turning the campaign around” 93.
* Templer focus on H+M, different to WM? “Templer is also famously quoted as saying in November 1952 that the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us” 94.
* Templer – not a static commander; “Travelling the country and visiting local communities was an important part of Templer’s approach” pg.95.
* Templer – approach to clearing areas of insurgency by zoning different areas white / red – those in the white no need for blanket punishment – meant not the whole population targeted. 95.
* Importance of intel identified by Templer; “Very high rewards were also offered to surrendered enemy personnel (SEP), who were then used both to gather intelligence and also to lead the security forces back to the insurgent camps” 96.
* Definition of doctrine – 98.
* Importance of the joint approach; : “The importance of having sound intelligence was emphasised, as was the necessity for daily conferences between military, civilian and police commanders” pg.100.
* Anti Guerilla operation manual 1955, clearly prioritises H+M; “a) To win for ourselves the cooperation of the civilian population and thus deny it to the guerrillas” 104.
* British – learnt from experience in Malaya to create manual for counterinsurgency ops; “again, principles developed from experience are articulated, such as cooperation between the triumvirate and joint planning, having a sound intelligence network, winning public confidence” 110.
* British – focussed on clearly splitting the local population between insurgents and friendlies – key to success – no friendly fire etc; “The most important factor in destroying the CT is to complete his isolation from the rest of the community” -111.
* 1949 Briefing (Lt Col Walker) on jungle war techniques; “The qualities required of the real jungle fighter are not those of the elephant but rather of the poacher, gangster and cat-burgler” 112.
  + Templer – used jungle warfare school to emphasis these points, 114.
* Templer / Briggs APPROACH; “The Briggs and Templer years of the Emergency saw them react to critical incidents in a coordinated manner, concentrating on political aims, military support to the civil authority, intelligence and ‘hearts and minds’ “ pg.115.
* Templer – inclusive / shared vision; “his belief in an holistic approach and that the daily business of running a country and the Emergency were intertwined gave all the actors involved a common goal” 117
* Templer- “the most fitting word to describe Templer is dynamic” pg117.
  + “in short, he energised the situation and inspired others to follow his example and approach” 118
  + “By fighting for the hearts and minds of the people he had stimulated in them a will to win” Barber (pg119)
  + “Templer’s long history of experience in relevant posts, coupled with his charismatic personality meant that he could be highly influential in the evolution of a distinctive approach to small wars for the British army” 127.
  + Mackay; “more than anything it was the quality of leadership that could lift a performance from merely adequate to the excellent” 131.
  + “It was apparent the more successful the leader, the more he possess charismatic qualities” 133
* Templer – had backing of politicians – key to being able to carry out plan; “Templer said subsequently, ‘I knew I had to have absolute backing – or the task wouldn’t have been possible’” 122.
* Focus on H+M; “It was realized that gaining and retaining the support of the local population, and showing that the legitimate government had more to offer them than the guerillas and communists, were the key to success” 131