

## THE PHILIPPINES TO THE END OF SPANISH RULE

DURING the first half of the seventeenth century the Spanish hold upon the Philippines was strenuously challenged by the Dutch. Although they came into the island world of South-East Asia mainly in order to wrest control over the spice trade from the Portuguese, the Dutch were equally concerned to break the power of Spain. Quite apart from their general hostility to Spain as the enemy of their independence, they were impelled by two special considerations. In the first place the Spaniards from their Philippine bases could give vital assistance to the Portuguese in the Moluccas; in the second Manila's strategic position as an entrepôt for Far Eastern trade offered dazzling opportunities of which the Dutch were only too well aware. Hence their onslaught upon the Hispano-Portuguese power in the Moluccas was accompanied by a grim naval warfare waged year after year in Philippine waters. It began in 1600 with an attempt by Oliver van Noort to intercept the Acapulco galleon. When he failed to do so, he cruised about Manila Bay plundering Chinese and Filipino shipping. But at the battle of Mariveles the Spaniards inflicted so severe a check on him that he had to limp away with the loss of one of his ships.

The Spanish counter-attacks in the Moluccas, which culminated in the downfall of Sultan Zaide of Ternate in 1606, provoked a new Dutch offensive under Cornelis Matalief which inflicted much damage upon Spanish and Portuguese forts and sea patrols in Indonesian waters, and Matalief, on returning home, advised the States General to make an all-out attack upon the Philippines in alliance with the Moros. This was made in 1609, the year of the conclusion of the Twelve Years Truce between Spain and Holland; for there was no let-up in their warfare in the East. A powerful Dutch fleet under Admiral Wittert attacked first the port of Iloilo on Panay, but finding the opposition too determined went on to Manila Bay, which it blockaded for five months. The Spaniards, however, decisively defeated his fleet on 26 April 1610 in a stretch of water known as Playa Honda not far from Manila, and Wittert himself was killed. The indefatigable Governor-General Juan de Silva then followed up this success by an incursion into the Moluccas.

There, however, he found the enemy so well established on the island of Amboyna that he returned home to prepare for a much greater effort involving the co-operation of Goa. This offensive was launched early in 1616, but came to nothing. The Portuguese fleet was late in arriving at the rendezvous, and while awaiting them at Malacca de Silva died and his second-in-command thereupon took the armada back to Manila.

In the meantime the Dutch, convinced that while Manila could come to the help of the Portuguese in the Moluccas their own trade would be insecure, had undertaken a new effort to conquer the Philippines. Thus while de Silva's expedition was in Indonesian waters, Joris van Speilbergen with a Dutch squadron, that had sailed via the Magellan Straits, appeared before the entrance to Manila Bay at the end of February 1616. Had he attacked, the city must have fallen. But hearing of de Silva's expedition he sailed away to Ternate, only to find that the great offensive had misfired. In the following year, however, the Dutch returned to the attack; a second battle was fought at Playa Honda and again they sustained a severe defeat. They continued, however, to harass the Philippines. In 1618 and 1619 their squadrons entered Manila Bay and plundered shipping, and in 1620 they made another abortive attack upon the Manila-bound galleon from Acapulco. They could sail about almost at will, for after the sea-fight in 1617 the Spaniards could not muster another fleet capable of challenging them; and in 1619 the Anglo-Dutch treaty was signed which placed English ships also at the disposal of Jan Peterszoon Coen. In January 1621 an Anglo-Dutch fleet began the blockade of Manila, and kept it up until May of the following year, preventing any ships from leaving or entering the Bay. Again the Spaniards were unable to take effective action at sea. Their opponents, on the other hand, made no attempt to test the defences of Manila, but contented themselves with immobilizing the trade of the port.

In 1622 the Dutch planted a fort on the Pescadores Islands from which to intercept the trade of Manila with China and Japan. In 1624 they transferred to Formosa, and managed to divert to that island much of the Chinese trade that normally went to Manila. But the Spaniards could still struggle gamely. They won a third naval engagement with a Dutch squadron at Playa Honda, and in the lull which ensued sent an expedition to Formosa and established two forts there as a counterpoise to the Dutch. They also fought the Moros, who were receiving arms from the Dutch, and strengthened their forts in the Moluccas. They still possessed five there, but they were in such jeopardy from Dutch attack that Spaniards on the spot believed that

without much stronger military support from home, they, and indeed the whole Spanish empire in the western Pacific, would fall into Dutch hands.

After a longish spell of commerce-raiding the Dutch went over to the offensive again in 1640, the year of the Portuguese breakaway from Spain under Braganza leadership. In 1641 Malacca fell, and in the following year the Dutch captured the Spanish strongholds on Formosa, thereby securing a valuable base for operations against the Philippines just to the north of Luzon. In July 1645 they bombarded the Spanish fort at Jolo, though without success. The year 1646 saw no less than five naval engagements in which the Spaniards with two reconditioned old galleons inflicted one reverse after another upon Dutch marauding squadrons. The fighting culminated in 1647 with an attack upon Manila Bay by Martin Gerretsen with a fleet of twelve ships. He bombarded the fort at Cavite, but was repulsed and killed and his flagship sunk in an intense artillery fight. The remainder of his force then made the island of Corregidor their base and plundered the towns of Bataan until, deterred by Spanish and Filipino resistance and the outbreak of an epidemic among them, they abandoned the enterprise and sailed away. In 1648 Spain and the United Provinces signed the Treaty of Munster, and Dutch attacks upon the Philippines ceased. Their raiding, however, continued; it only ceased when, on account of Coxinga's threat to attack Manila in 1662, the Spanish garrisons were withdrawn from Zamboanga and the Moros area, and at the same time from Ternate.

The Spanish success in retaining the Philippines, in spite of the long series of Dutch attempts to destroy their hold upon the islands, was of decisive importance in South-East Asian history. It had been one of the main recommendations of Jan Peterszoon Coen's political programme that Manila and Macao should be conquered and Hispano-Portuguese power overthrown in the western Pacific. The Dutch failure was due in large measure to the tenacity of the Spaniards in defence and counter-attack; but perhaps in even larger measure to the loyalty of the Filipinos to their Spanish masters. When one takes into account the appalling sacrifices the Filipinos were called upon to make, the fact that the Spaniards were able to command adequate support from them to repel both the Dutch and their allies the Moros bears striking testimony to the work of the Catholic missionaries.

By the middle of the seventeenth century the Spanish effort to subdue the Moros had reached a position of stalemate. The abandonment of Zamboanga in a moment of panic greatly stimulated Moro raids,

especially upon the Christian communities in the islands just to the north of Mindanao. Hence, as soon as the Coxinga threat was lifted, the Jesuits began to agitate for the reoccupation of the fort, and in 1666, as a result of their pressure, the queen-regent sent instructions to that effect. But they were disregarded: the settlement had been very costly to maintain, and the Manila authorities had begun to cherish the hope that negotiation was worth a trial, since the Muslim Malays had come to have a real interest in trade with the Spanish-controlled regions. Moreover, what had once been semi-feudal confederacies of Magindanaus and Sulus were, long before the end of the century, becoming welded into centralized sultanates with claims to international status. In 1704 Manila was invited to arbitrate in a quarrel between the sultans of Magindanau and Sulu, and the opposing parties not only accepted a Jesuit priest as arbitrator, but his decision as well. Nevertheless, royal orders continued to be issued every so often for the reoccupation of Zamboanga until finally in 1718 the standard of Spain was unfurled once more over the fort of Our Lady of Pilar, and military expeditions again directed against the Moros.

The peace-by-negotiation policy was not, however, abandoned. In the seventeen-twenties a commercial treaty was made with the Sultan of Sulu which provided also that Christian captives should be released and Christianity tolerated in the sultan's dominions. And, prompted by the Jesuits, Philip V sent personal messages to the Moro chiefs offering them alliances with Spain. Neither force nor conciliation had any appreciable effect upon the situation. The Moros continued to raid and to be in effect the real masters of the Philippine seas.

Among the rulers approached by Philip V was Alimud Din, Sultan of Sulu, a learned and respected ruler, who had revised the Sulu code of laws and translated Arabic texts, including parts of the Koran, into the Sulu language. At the king's request in 1744 he agreed to permit a Jesuit to preach in his dominions, and a Spanish church and fort to be erected. Five years later, however, his brother Bantilan, disliking the pro-Spanish tendency of his policy, seized the throne. Alimud Din and his family escaped to Zamboanga and thence went on to Manila, where they were welcomed. He accepted Christian baptism, and sent his son and daughter to school in Manila, where he came to be known as Don Fernando de Alimud Din I, Catholic Sultan of Jolo. In 1751 he accompanied a Spanish expedition against Jolo, which aimed at restoring him; but, on the grounds that a letter, alleged to have been written by him to the Sultan of Mindanao, was treasonable, he was sent back to

Manila and imprisoned, though later he was accorded a measure of freedom and a monthly pension. As we have already seen,<sup>1</sup> he was still living in Manila at the time of the British capture of the city in 1762. The British restored him to his throne, but he soon abdicated in favour of his son Israel, who reigned until 1778, when he in his turn was deposed by a son of Bantilan.

The British occupation of Manila (October 1762–May 1764) was an incident in the Seven Years War. The British Government expected it to yield enormous plunder and do serious damage to Spanish commerce in the Pacific, but had not envisaged its retention after the war. They certainly aimed at ousting Spain from the China seas, in extending their own commerce there, but thought that the annexation of the island of Mindanao might best serve this purpose. The news of the capture of the city, however, did not reach Europe in time to affect the peace negotiations at Paris, and the East India Company were thus prevented from using it as a bargaining counter. Manila was handed back to Spain, and the huge ransom of four million dollars, promised by the Spanish authorities when the city surrendered, was repudiated by Madrid. In any case, the splendid resistance, led by the lieutenant-governor Don Simon de Anda, which prevented the British from extending their conquests beyond Manila, showed that the annexation of the Philippines was out of the question.

The effects of the occupation upon the Philippines, on the other hand, were far-reaching. World attention became focused on Manila for the first time; for a few months it was opened to foreign trade, and British and other foreign merchants came to examine its potentialities as a commercial centre. More important still, the ease with which the city had been captured broke for ever Spain's military prestige, and rebellions flared up everywhere. It is not surprising therefore that during the later years of the eighteenth century the Moro raids became worse than ever before. Every Christian town between Mindanao and Luzon suffered horribly. Attacks were even made upon the coasts of Luzon up to the very wharves of Manila. Thousands were massacred and enslaved, and it was estimated that an average of 500 Filipinos a year were sold in the slave markets of the Malay Archipelago. The Spaniards, notwithstanding a vast expenditure upon expeditions against the Moros, seemed to be helpless; actually, nothing availed until the advent of the steamship in the next century.

The systematic propagation of Christianity among the Filipino peoples gave to the religious orders who supplied the missionaries,

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 535.

the Augustinians, the Franciscans, the Jesuits, the Dominicans and the Recollects—to name them in the order of their arrival in the Philippines—a necessarily important place in the colony. As in all Spanish colonies, Church and State were united. There were two sets of authorities, civil and ecclesiastical, and their work necessarily overlapped. Ideally they formed the interrelated parts of one whole. The civil authority from the governor-general downwards had, in addition to their ordinary duties, the supreme one of assisting the propagation of Christianity. The ecclesiastical authorities, besides tending to the spiritual needs of their flocks, were concerned with the maintenance and spread of Spanish sovereignty, and the cost of ecclesiastical administration was borne by the State. The position was that the Spanish Crown, having been entrusted by the papacy with the administration of the Church in the Indies, delegated to the regular clergy the task of Christianizing the native peoples.

From this relationship two main sources of contention arose. In the first place no satisfactory division between the civil and ecclesiastical authority could be made, and there were constant complaints by the civil authority of ecclesiastical interference involving the usurpation of its powers. In the second place the regular clergy, i.e. the members of religious orders, denied the right of the bishop to jurisdiction over them in their role as parish clergy, although it had been firmly laid down by the Council of Trent that no priest should exercise care over the souls of laymen without being subject to episcopal authority.

The struggle for power went on without abate throughout the whole Spanish period. On the churchmen's side it must be remembered that they were generally more interested in welfare than their opponents, and that in fact Spanish power in the Philippines depended more upon them than upon the army. But there can be no doubt that, like the Church in mediaeval Europe, the Church in the Philippines did tend to overstep the mark in the exercise of its authority, and that the complaints, which were so frequent, were not entirely without foundation.

A few special examples must suffice. In 1606 the fiscal of Manila reported to the king that ecclesiastics were interfering in local administration and making improper assessments upon the people. He asked that the Audiencia should be instructed to investigate the situation. In 1610 the governor-general himself reported an incident in which the Dominicans had brought about the escape of a condemned prisoner by threatening the *alcalde* with excommunication. A royal order to the Dominican provincial, telling him to restrain his subordinates

from meddling in civil affairs, resulted from this complaint. In 1618 the Augustinians were the subject of a complaint; they were accused of charging excessive fees for masses, burials and other services, and of levying taxes for the erection of churches and convents without the sanction of the civil authority. The king in response issued a decree against this, but the governor-general reported that the archbishop of Manila thought the decree unnecessary. Hence, in 1622 another royal decree ordering the ecclesiastical authority to stop 'irregularities' was issued. Royal decrees, however, seem to have had no effect, and in local government matters the friars tended to be more readily obeyed than the *alcalde mayor*.

In trying to uphold the civil power two governors-general came to grief. In the first case, which occurred in the sixteen-forties, Governor-General Hurtado de Corcuera and Archbishop Hernando Guerrero came to loggerheads over a soldier, who had killed a girl and taken refuge in an Augustinian church. Corcuera had the soldier apprehended and executed, and the archbishop's protests resulted in his own imprisonment in Fort Santiago. On the expiry of the governor-general's term of office the *residencia* sentenced him to five years' imprisonment, and notwithstanding his distinguished services against the Moros the king refused to interfere with the court's decision. The second case was that of Governor-General Diego de Salcedo, who in 1668 was arrested by the Inquisition because when his opponent Archbishop Miguel Poblete died, he forbade the bells to be tolled or the body embalmed. But the real cause of trouble was said to have been that he had refused a military office to the nephew of the commissary of the Inquisition. On his way to Mexico to answer the charges he died; he was subsequently exonerated.

In 1680 a tremendous controversy broke out over a complaint to Governor-General Vargas on the part of the parish priest of Vigan that the acting head of the diocese of Nueva Segovia had interfered with the exercise of his functions, although he did not reside in the diocese. The matter was brought before the Audiencia, and when Archbishop Pardo challenged its right to hear the case, he was deported to Lingayen, and a number of his fellow Dominicans, who supported him, were banished to various other places. But the governor-general's successor in 1684 upheld the archbishop's claim, and Vargas and his associates were all excommunicated. Vargas himself was offered pardon if he would publicly perform a most humiliating penance. When he refused, he was confined to an island in the Pasig River. In 1689 he also died while on his way to Mexico, a prisoner. In 1719 Governor-General

Bustamente was murdered in the course of a quarrel with the ecclesiastical authority over the arrest of the archbishop, when he refused to hand over an accused man who had taken refuge in a church. The friars led a rabble which attacked the governor's palace, and in the ensuing mêlée he and his son were killed. In each of these cases the governor-general abandoned a strong position by an arbitrary act which put him in the wrong, or appeared to. Hence the sum effect of these struggles was the gradual enhancement of the Church's power at the expense of that of the civil authority, and Le Gentil's comment in 1781 that the religious orders in the Philippines were more absolute than the king himself, was only too true. This state of affairs was to bring its own nemesis in the nineteenth century, when the friars had lost their missionary ardour and found themselves faced with the growing opposition of the Filipino people.

The struggle over episcopal visitation had in the long run an even more profound effect upon Philippine history than the conflict between the lay and ecclesiastical authorities. Beginning as a conflict about episcopal jurisdiction over regular clergy exercising parochial functions, it developed into one between the regular and the secular clergy for possession of the parishes; and as the Spanish friars clung to their parochial rights, and sought to prevent them from passing into the hands of the Filipino secular priests, it became racial in character, and thus a main factor in the later nineteenth-century revolutionary movement.

The regular clergy, who undertook the task of Christianizing the Filipinos, were subject to the heads of their respective orders, known as 'provincials', but as parish priests they were nominally under episcopal jurisdiction, and they objected to this. Against them were ranged the ruling of the Council of Trent (1564), Canon Law, which laid down the episcopal right of 'visitation', and the decrees of the papacy. Bishop Salazar, who had had long experience in Mexico, where episcopal visitation was accepted by the friars, asserted his right to this type of jurisdiction in 1582, and was supported by the governor-general. He had, however, to abandon the plan in practice because of the opposition of the friar-missionaries. A second attempt was made in 1620 by Archbishop Serrano to enforce visitation; but, although he appealed to the king, he failed. Archbishop Poblete in 1654 made the third attempt to assert episcopal authority over the friar-curates, but had to abandon it because the Audiencia supported his opponents; and he could not fight the matter to the final issue because he had at his disposal only 59 seculars as against 254 friar-curates.



At the end of the century Archbishop Camacho seized the opportunity to raise the matter again, when the friars appealed to him for support against the Audiencia over its action in investigating the validity of their land-titles. He was willing to help them, he told them, if they would accept episcopal visitation. When they refused, he supported the investigator appointed by the Audiencia. The procurators of the religious orders in Madrid thereupon (1699) delivered a protest to the king in which they offered him the alternative of granting exemption from episcopal control or the withdrawal of all friars from curacies. As there were only 60 secular priests for some 800 parishes, they felt themselves to be on strong ground. Nevertheless, the king in May 1700 issued a decree supporting the archbishop, and in January 1705 the pope issued a bull confirming the powers claimed by Camacho. Yet the friars again won the day. Their hostility resulted in such turbulence that the governor-general and the Audiencia withdrew their support from the archbishop. His successor, Archbishop Cuesta, on taking office in 1707 renewed the struggle by insisting upon putting the papal bull into effect. But the reports of the resistance so alarmed the king that he ordered the archbishop to postpone all action until further notice.

The matter was revived once more in 1767, when Archbishop de Santa Justa ordered the regular clergy in the parishes to submit to visitation. He had the support of the governor-general on the strength of orders received from Madrid. The Pope also had issued two bulls ordering the friar-curates to accept visitation. Because of this the Dominicans in council decided to accept the archbishop's mandate. After long discussion a compromise was arrived at and embodied in a royal decree issued in December 1776. The friar-curates were to accept visitation but only by their own superiors. Episcopal visitation was to be limited to parishes served by secular clergy.

In 1768 the Jesuits were expelled from the Philippines—for reasons connected purely with European history—and as a result the secularization question came into the foreground. The parish vacancies caused by their departure were filled with secular priests. The seculars appointed were all Filipinos, and because of the shortage of candidates some of the new priests were inadequately trained and highly unsuitable. Governor-General Anda, however, thought he had found the key to the solution of the visitation problem, and on his advice the king in 1774 decreed that all parishes on becoming vacant were to be secularized. Once again the anger of the friars blazed forth, and with apparent reason because of the low quality of the appointees. The complaints

reaching the king were so bitter that in 1776 he suspended further secularization. It was a sad blow to the cause of the Filipino clergy. In 1804 the pendulum swung still further against them, when a beginning was made to the restoration to the regular clergy of parishes previously taken from them. But a worse blow still fell in 1861 when, to compensate the Recollect friars for the loss of the missions in Mindanao restored to the Jesuits on their return to the Philippines in 1859, a number of wealthy parishes in the Manila neighbourhood in the hands of secular priests were transferred to them. The situation now was vastly different from what it had been in 1776: the Filipino seculars were now well educated and thoroughly competent, and they bitterly resented the slurs cast upon their race, intelligence and morality in the very unpleasant controversy which this grave blunder stirred up.

Their cause was championed by one of their number, the learned Father Pedro Pelaez, who became acting archbishop of Manila in April 1862. Only a month earlier he had addressed a strong remonstrance to Queen Isabella II asking for the revocation of the decree of the previous year ordering the transfer of the parishes. His plea was rejected, but he went on to lead a powerful campaign against racial discrimination. When he lost his life in the Manila earthquake of 3 June 1863, his pupil Father José Burgos continued the agitation. His *Manifesto to the Noble Spanish People*, published in June 1864, attacked with tremendous vigour the current assertions of the superiority of the white race, but it failed in its objective. In 1870 there were still only 181 out of 792 parishes administered by the Filipino clergy. In that year, however, the Spanish Archbishop of Manila, realizing that the growing resentment against the regular clergy was stirring up strong anti-Spanish feeling, wrote a serious warning to the Regent of Spain, saying that grave evil, involving the danger of revolution, might result from the secularization grievance. But once again Spain did nothing. When, indeed, in 1896 the nationalist explosion came, the secularization question was one of its strongest ingredients.

The galleon trade brought such prosperity to Manila before the end of the sixteenth century, and expanded so rapidly that before long the Seville and Cadiz merchants, who managed Spain's export trade to America, began to be worried lest the flood of oriental goods—notably Chinese textiles—would affect their own trade and the manufacturing industries upon which it drew. The export of a large quantity of silver from Spanish America to the orient instead of to Spain was a further source of worry to minds, dominated as they were by the bullionist theory. Accordingly, in 1593 Spain applied a closed-door policy to

Philippine commerce, and applied it with full rigour until 1815. Philippine commerce with Spanish America had to be carried on in government-owned galleons only and with Manila and Acapulco in Mexico as its sole terminals. In 1585 Philip II had tried to stop all Chinese trade with Manila, but the viceroy of Mexico had refused to take action. He then forbade the shipment of Chinese textiles from Mexico to Peru, and direct trade between Peru and the Philippines. When in 1593 the Manila-Acapulco run became the rule, it was laid down that exports from Manila to Mexico were to be restricted to a maximum value of 250,000 pesos, and imports to Manila from Mexico to 500,000 pesos, while the run was to be limited to two galleons of not more than 300 tons burden each. But the Manila merchants ignored the quota, and the colonial officials connived at the evasions. When royal decrees reaffirming the quota had no effect, and the Seville and Cadiz merchants were losing heavily, the king in 1635 sent Pedro de Quiroga to investigate. His severe measures, however, aroused so much opposition that the Manila merchants refused to freight the Acapulco galleon, and in the years 1636 and 1637 the galleon trade was at a standstill. Their protests eventually won the day: in 1640 a new royal decree fixed the quotas at the more realistic maxima of 300,000 and 600,000 pesos, with two galleons of not more than 500 tons burden each to carry the trade. In 1734 the quotas were raised to 500,000 and one million pesos, but the galleons reduced to one.

In the eighteenth century the galleons varied in burden from 300 to 2,000 tons and were armed with from forty to sixty guns each. Many of them were built in the Philippines, of excellent local unsplinterable hardwood and equipped with equally good local-made cordage and sail-cloth. Their Filipino builders were first-rate craftsmen, and their Filipino crews were among the best seamen of the Pacific. Their crews numbered between 60 and 100, and in addition they might carry up to 400 passengers. In the seventeenth century usually more than two made the annual voyage across the Pacific. In the 1730s, however, the number was reduced to two; but the cost was found to be too high, and the Manila authorities limited the number to one. To Mexico they carried Chinese silk fabrics, cotton and linen cloths, porcelain, spices, amber, musk and perfumes. From Mexico they brought anything from a million to three million silver pesos, vastly exceeding the legal limit. Losses were heavy through typhoons, overloading or the incompetence of navigating officers. Some fell into the hands of English freebooters; others during the Anglo-Spanish wars of the eighteenth century were captured by the British Navy. These losses,

combined with the establishment of the Royal Company of the Philippines in 1785, and the smuggling trade with Mexico developed by British and American private venturers, caused the galleon trade monopoly to lose its value so much that in April 1815 it was abolished, and the trade of Mexico, California, Peru and Ecuador was opened to Philippine commerce.

The galleon trade had effects of great importance in Philippine history. It drew most Spaniards to the Manila area, and far too much attention was paid to it by the officials, to the neglect of agriculture and industry. More important still in the long run was the fact that it forged strong links between the Philippines and America. Manila was the gateway to trade with Spanish America, and the channel through which Mexican pesos flowed into eastern Asia. But by concentrating upon the American connection the Spaniards failed to develop Philippine trade with Asia: the economic ties of the Philippines were with America rather than Asia.

The events of the eighteenth century, and notably the shock of the British occupation of Manila, resulted in the beginnings of a new policy abandoning isolation. It began to show itself clearly during the governor-generalship of José de Basco y Vargas (1778-87), when for the first time a comprehensive plan to develop the natural resources of the Philippines was set in motion. Through the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, which he founded in 1781, he sought to foster all kinds of cultivation suitable to the country, indigo, cotton, tobacco, cinnamon, pepper, sugar on a big scale, silk, hemp, tea, coffee and the opium poppy. In the following year he established the government tobacco monopoly, by which tobacco was to be cultivated in certain areas under government supervision and sold at a fixed price to the government. Large tracts of land were taken into cultivation in this way, and the Philippines became the chief tobacco-producing country in the East. Governmental revenue was much increased, so much so that the profits of the monopoly helped to make the Philippines financially self-supporting during the nineteenth century. On the other hand the operation of the monopoly opened the way for much official corruption and oppression. Together with other government monopolies, notably that of wine, it caused much popular unrest.

Vargas aimed at making the Philippines economically independent of Mexico. For many years the idea of direct trade between Spain and Manila had been discussed. King Philip V (1700-1746) had actually formed a company for trade with Manila via the Cape of Good Hope, but the opposition of the Manila merchants caused the scheme to be dropped.

Charles III (1759–88) ordered the opening of direct trade, and in 1766 sent a royal frigate with a cargo of European goods round the Cape to Manila, and, even in face of the refusal of the Manila merchants to co-operate, maintained the practice annually until 1783. In 1785 he went a step further by establishing the Royal Company of the Philippines with himself as a principal shareholder. It was given monopolistic trade privileges with Manila, no tariffs were to be charged on the import of Philippine products into Europe, and a percentage of the company's net profits was to be invested in Philippine industry. After some successful early ventures, however, it failed, partly because of the opposition of the Manila merchants engaged in the galleon trade, but also through bad management. Yet its effects upon the Philippine economy were beneficial: it invested money in textile factories, in the production of pepper and spices and the manufacture of indigo, sugar and silk.

The royal decree of 6 September 1834, which abolished the Royal Company, opened the port of Manila to world trade. Spanish mercantilism, which had again clamped down its restrictions upon Philippine trade after the British occupation, remained as rigid as ever, but Mexico's declaration of independence in 1821, and subsequent secession, forced Spain's hand. Hostility to foreigners was intense. In 1800 they had been forbidden by royal edict to live in the Philippines. How little real effect the edict had is shown by the fact that within a very few years it had to be reissued more than once. In 1828 foreigners were forbidden to engage in retail trade, or visit the provinces for purposes of trade. As late as 1857 these anti-foreign laws were renewed. Foreigners were the enemies of God and Spain, the Filipinos were told, and the 'Cholera Massacre' of 1820 was a grim reminder of the way the Spaniards could work up mob frenzy against them. But in spite of the often-repeated decrees against them, foreigners did gradually work their way into the Philippine economy after the opening of Manila to foreign trade in 1834. Keen rivalry, indeed, developed between American and British merchants for trade supremacy there. The latter won, for with their far-flung banking connections and commercial bases at Hong Kong, Singapore and in India, they were in a more favourable position to push their trade in the Philippines. The opening of the islands to world commerce also stimulated developments in their agriculture, and their hemp and tobacco became famous in the markets of the world. And such things in turn stimulated road-building, the construction of harbour-facilities and port works, the development of a modern postal and telegraph service and of a modern banking system.

All this material progress brought into being, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, a new middle class of Filipino families, often with mixed Chinese or Spanish blood, prosperous, well-educated, becoming increasingly Westernized, and interested in sending its sons abroad to widen their outlook. It was through these people that the old isolationism, which had kept Filipino society largely *incomunicado* from the outside world, was broken down. And with the impact of modern ideas and nineteenth-century liberalism came the beginnings of the political awakening of the Filipino people.

For most of the Spanish period education in the Philippines was exclusively in the hands of the missionary friars and Jesuits, and aimed at propagating Christianity and Spanish culture through the medium of the Spanish language. On the lowest level there were parochial schools, the first of which was founded on the island of Cebu as early as 1565. On the secondary level there were a number of boys' colleges, in the founding of which the Jesuits took the lead, opening their first in Manila in 1589. They also took the lead in higher education when their college of San Ignacio received papal recognition as a university in 1681. It was followed by the Dominican foundation of Santo Tomas, recognized by Innocent X in 1645, which in 1870 became the University of the Philippines. Some colleges for girls were also established in connection with convents. But until the second half of the nineteenth century Spanish education was given only to a very small proportion of the people, and few Filipinos received secondary education.

The secession of Mexico, which brought the Philippines into direct relations with Spain, also brought to the Philippines many Spaniards imbued with the new liberal ideas that were stirring Europe. The ruling concept of education as the handmaid of religion came thus to be challenged, and at the same time a growing demand arose for its extension. Ever since 1770 the establishment of a system of public primary education had been spasmodically under consideration. Provision for it was at last made in 1863. The commission, upon whose report the new education code was based, had been decreed in 1839, appointed in 1855, and took six years over its deliberations. Spain was not in a hurry to provide the Filipinos with the means for their own emancipation.

The code laid down that at the headquarters of every *pueblo* there must be at least one primary school for boys and one for girls. Attendance was to be compulsory, and for the poor free. The parish priest was to be the local inspector, and the direction of the system was vested in Provincial Boards dominated by ecclesiastics and a Superior

Commission presided over by the Archbishop of Manila. Normal schools were to be set up for the training of teachers. The first, for men, was opened in Manila in 1865. The figures given in various sources for the numbers of schools and pupils vary, but it would appear that by the end of the Spanish régime the Philippines had some 2,150 public schools with a total enrolment of well over 200,000 pupils. As far back as 1843, long before the system came into operation, a Spanish investigator stated that in proportion there were more literates in the Philippines than in Spain herself. By the end of the nineteenth century they were ahead of any other country of South-East Asia in education, and particularly in female education, and there were said to be better schools there than Spain established anywhere in America. The spread of the Spanish language and the Latin alphabet linked the Filipinos closer to Europe than to Asia. Thus culturally as well as economically the Philippines stood apart in South-East Asia. Nowhere else had Western culture and Christianity made so powerful an impact. Nowhere else also had a modern-type nationalist movement shown itself as a powerful and cohesive force.

Opposition by force to Spanish rule never ceased in the Philippines. The Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago from the start had rejected Spanish domination outright and vigorously retaliated against all attempts to conquer them. In the middle of the seventeenth century they forced the Spaniards so much on to the defensive that they had to leave their settlements in Formosa in the lurch in order to concentrate on the danger from Mindanao. Not until late in the nineteenth century, when the steamship and modern arms forced the brave people of Sulu to acknowledge defeat, was the pacification of the Moros completed. In July 1878 the sultan capitulated and accepted Spanish suzerainty.

Elsewhere also in the territories occupied by Spain attempts were made again and again to cast off her yoke. More than one hundred were of appreciable size. In the seventeenth century discontent with the hardships caused by the long struggle with the Dutch was a main source of trouble, but there was no general outbreak and Spanish power was never seriously threatened. They were usually local disturbances due to forced labour, the appalling slowness of government in paying for services or goods, and other crushing burdens. Some, like the Bohol revolt in 1621, the Leyte rising which followed it, and in particular the uprising of 1660-1 in Pangasinan and Ilokos were anti-Spanish in character and aimed at the restoration of what the Church called 'paganism'. They were watched with sympathy in other parts of the islands, but regional jealousies were such as to enable the Spaniards

to crush each revolt with the help of 'friendly Indians'. Only a handful of Spanish soldiers was used. In Bohol in 1744 there was an unusual type of revolt, which began over the refusal of a parish curate to bury a body in consecrated ground. Three thousand rebels under Francisco Dagahoy, the brother of the deceased man, murdered priests, fled to the hills and defeated every attempt to dislodge them. Dagahoy established an independent régime which lasted until 1829, long after his death. His followers increased in number to some 20,000, and when, after very hard fighting, the patriots were overcome and accepted pardon, there were 19,420 survivors.

Discontent with the occupation—of disputed legality—of Filipino lands by the religious orders caused a whole series of agrarian uprisings in 1745–6 in the provinces of Bulacan, Batangas, Laguna, Cavite and Risal, around Manila. They were so serious that Philip VI appointed an investigator into the charges brought against the ecclesiastics. They refused, however, to submit their land-titles to a secular judge and although they were adjudged to have usurped the lands, and the decision was upheld on appeal by both the Audiencia and the Council of the Indies in Madrid, they refused to hand them over and eventually won their case.

The British occupation of Manila (1762–4) triggered off a number of rebellions because of the ease with which the Spaniards had been defeated. The most important was led by Diego Silang in the Ilokos region. He began by asking for the abolition of tribute, because of the Spanish failure to defend the country, and offered to lead Iloko troops against the British. When his demands were refused, he made Vigan the capital of an independent government which maintained itself against all attacks for nearly a year. Silang was assassinated, but his heroic wife, the 'Ilokano Joan of Arc', held out for some months until hunted down and captured by a flying brigade of loyal Filipinos. There were about a dozen other risings at the time, but the vigorous action of Governor-General Anda, helped by militant friars and loyal Filipinos, caused their failure in every case. Although many of the leaders of the revolts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are today acclaimed as national heroes, their revolts were purely local in character, and it has been well said that 'it took two hundred and fifty years of the *pax hispanica* before a Philippine national consciousness could become articulate'.<sup>1</sup>

The nineteenth century saw a growing spirit of unrest in the Philippines. There were risings due to the abuses of the monopoly system

<sup>1</sup> J. L. Phelan, *Hispanization of the Philippines*, 1959, p. 151.



and also to the rapacity of the religious orders. But developments elsewhere, in Spain and Spanish America, now began to have their influence. The Sarrat rebellion of 1815, for instance, was caused by the decree of Ferdinand VII suppressing the liberal Spanish Constitution of 1812. The dramatic Novales Mutiny of 1823, which almost resulted in the seizure of Manila by rebellious Filipino troops, arose out of racial discrimination in the army. Racial discrimination in ecclesiastical matters caused the revolt of 1841-2, which itself led to the mutiny of the Tagalog Regiment in 1843. All these revolts, like those of the earlier period, failed, and for the same reasons. National cohesion was completely lacking, and none of the revolutionary leaders was a national figure. But they were of great significance, for they were the sign of an unquenchable spirit of independence, which deeply resented Spanish pride and intolerance and the rapacity of the religious orders.

National sentiment existed, but it was inchoate and very slow in expressing itself effectively. The geography of the islands, of course, was a great hindrance to its development as a conscious force. But by the middle of the century all the ingredients for a national movement were there. The Filipinos possessed a common racial origin, a common cultural heritage, to which Spain had contributed much, and a common hatred of the Spanish yoke. Spanish policy had helped to unite them by giving the islands for the first time a centralized government, and by spreading Christianity and Spanish civilization. The opening of the Philippines to world trade, and the rise of an enlightened middle class of Filipinos, were powerful factors in preparing the way for a nationalist movement, and it was this new middle class which provided the movement with its leaders.

The movement was sparked off by the Spanish revolution of 1868 when Queen Isabella II was dethroned, reactionary laws were repealed, the religious orders abolished, and universal suffrage and a free press established. The Philippines felt its impact, for colonial officials with democratic ideas were sent to the islands and the administration was transformed in the direction of greater autonomy. Newspapers and books with European liberal ideas circulated openly, and a liberal governor-general, De la Torre, abolished the censorship, fostered free discussion, and introduced an entirely new spirit of humanity into the relations of government and people.

The immediate effect of all this was a tremendous agitation among both priests and laymen for Filipinization. But General Prim, the moving spirit in the provisional government, set up after the queen's

flight, was assassinated in December 1870, and soon afterwards a reactionary governor-general was sent to replace De la Torre. The Filipino nationalist priests were forbidden to say mass, and De la Torre's policy was completely reversed. The mutiny of some 200 Filipino soldiers at Cavite in January 1872, speedily repressed, was magnified into an attempt at revolution, and numbers of laymen and priests, who had supported the liberal régime, were arrested for treason, and after a farcical trial given heavy prison sentences. Some were executed, among them three blameless Filipino priests, Fathers Burgos, Gomez and Zamora, who thereupon became the martyrs of the nationalist cause.

The judicial murder of the three priests was followed by the deportation of various Filipino leaders to penal colonies, and by such a persecution of intellectuals that many fled abroad to Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan, and in particular to London, Paris and Madrid itself. There they carried on a publicity campaign known as the 'Propaganda Movement' with such moderate demands as equality of Spaniards and Filipinos before the law, the assimilation of the Philippines as a Spanish province with representation in the Spanish cortes, the Filipinization of the parishes, and liberty of speech, the press, meeting and petition. Their aims were reform, not revolution. They themselves were loyalists. The chief Propagandists were the brilliant young Dr José Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar and Graciano López Jaena. Rizal, the soul of the movement, was born in 1861 and educated at the Jesuit college at Manila. He showed marked ability as a poet, writer and sculptor. Sent to complete his education in Spain, he there took his diploma as a doctor of medicine. He then travelled in Europe, and in 1887, in Berlin, published his novel *Noli Me Tangere*, in which he described Filipino sufferings under Spanish rule. Four years later its sequel, *El Filibusterismo*, in which he attacked the religious orders, was published in Ghent. These two novels did for the Filipino opposition to Spain what *Max Havelaar* did for the opponents of the Culture System in Java, or *Uncle Tom's Cabin* for the anti-slavery movement in the United States.

Rizal produced a vast amount of published work on a wide variety of subjects, much of it consisting of articles contributed to the organ of the Propaganda Movement *La Solidaridad*, a fortnightly journal founded by Jaena in Barcelona in 1889, and later transferred to Madrid, where Del Pilar became its editor until in 1895 it failed for lack of funds. In 1887 Rizal returned to Manila, but finding that his presence in the Philippines endangered his family he left and returned to Europe to continue his writing and propaganda. In June 1892, because of the eviction of his

father and sisters from their home on the Dominican estate of Calamba, he insisted on returning to Manila. There he tried to found the *Liga Filipina*, a peaceful association for the social and political betterment of his people, but his arrest a few days after its formal inauguration, and his deportation to Dapitan in Mindanao, brought its existence, and his own political career, to an end. He was not a revolutionary in the ordinary sense, but the Spanish government chose to treat him as one.

The propaganda movement also came to an end; support for it dried up, its leaders died in poverty and *La Solidaridad* went out of circulation. Spain was moved by their denunciations to announce reforms, but they were ludicrously inadequate. The way was thus open for the real revolutionaries to take the lead. In July 1892 a secret society, the Katipunan, was founded in Manila. It had two aims: to win independence by force and to unite all Filipinos into a nation-state. Its founder was Andres Bonifacio, of humble origin, orphaned at fourteen and self-educated. With him was associated Emilio Jacinto, also of humble origin but with a university education. The society was directed by a Supreme Council, which worked through local councils in each province and city; but real power was in the hands of a secret junta of three. The leaders got into contact with Rizal at Dapitan in July 1896, but he warned them that their plan to start a revolution was premature: much more preparation was needed. Matters were taken out of their hands, however, by the discovery of the Katipunan and its revolutionary plan, and when during August 1896 the government tried to apprehend Bonifacio and his associates, sporadic fighting began. Then almost simultaneously nationwide rebellion blazed up. It was met by a reign of terror, in which among others José Rizal was tried on charges of rebellion, sedition and illicit association, and on 30 December 1896 was shot. His death added fury to the revolution, but the initial movement, involving the capture of Manila, had collapsed, and Bonifacio had gone to take refuge in the hills of Montalban in northern Luzon. And against a new governor-general, Polovieja, who arrived with reinforcements in December, the main rebellion in the Cavite region, led by Aguinaldo, also failed, notwithstanding desperate resistance.

Bonifacio had set up a revolutionary government at Tejeros. Aguinaldo's brave stand, however, in the Cavite fighting showed him to be a better military leader, and in March 1897 a revolutionary assembly at Tejeros elected him President of the Philippine Republic. The deposed leader tried to set up a breakaway government at Limbon, but he and his brothers were caught and sentenced to death by a military court appointed by Aguinaldo.

Aguinaldo's revolutionaries, however, could not prevail against the much better equipped Spanish forces, and in July 1897 he himself took refuge in Bulacan. The way now seemed open for a settlement by negotiation, and with the warlike Polovieja removed from the scene by illness, his successor, Fernando Primo de Rivera, tried diplomacy. Aguinaldo was induced to reduce his demands very considerably, but even these the Spanish authorities could not accept. Finally in December 1897 the so-called Pact of Biacnabato was agreed upon, by which the revolution was to stop and its leaders go into voluntary exile in Hong Kong. Spain in her turn was to pay them the sum of 800,000 pesetas by instalments upon the surrender of their arms. The government was also to grant an indemnity of a further 900,000 pesetas to the families who had suffered from the war.

The pact was soon broken. Aguinaldo and his associates received the first instalment of their money, 400,000 pesetas, in Hong Kong, and proceeded to use it for the purchase of new arms. Primo de Rivera distributed a little money in cash to war sufferers, but the full sums promised were never paid. And nothing was done about the reforms, which had been the subject of the negotiations, although not formally stated in the terms of the 'pact'. It was a case of bad faith on both sides. In February 1898 new risings began, and shortly afterwards a new revolutionary government under General Francisco Makabulos established itself in central Luzon. Such was the situation when on 1 May of that year the Spanish fleet was sunk in Manila Bay by Commodore Dewey's American fleet.